The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Biased but in Doubt: Conflict and Decision Confidence
Open accessAbstract
Human reasoning is often biased by intuitive heuristics. A central question is whether the bias results from a failure to detect that the intuitions conflict with traditional normative considerations or from a failure to discard the tempting intuitions. The present study addressed this unresolved debate by using people's decision confidence as a nonverbal index of conflict detection. Participants were asked to indicate how confident they were after solving classic base-rate (Experiment 1) and conjunction fallacy (Experiment 2) problems in which a cued intuitive response could be inconsistent or consistent with the traditional correct response. Results indicated that reasoners showed a clear confidence decrease when they gave an intuitive response that conflicted with the normative response. Contrary to popular belief, this establishes that people seem to acknowledge that their intuitive answers are not fully warranted. Experiment 3 established that younger reasoners did not yet show the confidence decrease, which points to the role of improved bias awareness in our reasoning development. Implications for the long standing debate on human rationality are discussed.
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Cites
On the psychology of prediction.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0034747 · Cited by 6,202 · cited 4×
“Decades of reasoning and decision-making research have shown that similar intuitive thinking is biasing people’s judgment in a wide range of situations and tasks [1,2].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialDual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 · Cited by 5,137
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Integration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious
Epstein, S. (1994) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.49.8.709 · Cited by 2,883 · cited 2×
“The basic point we want to note here is that while we agree with Sloman and Epstein that detection is flawless, we do not necessarily share their specific dual process assumptions as put forward in their original models.”
ResultWason, P. C. (1968) · Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1080/14640746808400161 · Cited by 1,476
Reyna, V. F., & Farley, F. (2006) · Psychological Science in the Public Interest · doi:10.1111/j.1529-1006.2006.00026.x · Cited by 1,244 · cited 1×
“[39,46–48]) this differential bias awareness argues against the idea of a developmental standstill in human reasoning.”
BackgroundOn the relative independence of thinking biases and cognitive ability
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2008) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.94.4.672 · Cited by 840
Wason, P. C., & Evans, J. S. B. T. (1974) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(74)90017-1 · Cited by 575
An evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning
Osman, M. (2004) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/bf03196730 · Cited by 444
Self-citation
Cited by
Misinformation and Its Correction: Continued Influence and Successful Debiasing
Lewandowsky, S., Ecker, U. K. H., Seifert, C. M., Schwarz, N., & Cook, J. (2012) · Psychological Science in the Public Interest · doi:10.1177/1529100612451018 · Cited by 2,920
What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement
Pennycook, G., Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J. (2015) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2015.05.001 · Cited by 475
Bias and Conflict: A Case for Logical Intuitions
De Neys, W. (2012) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691611429354 · Cited by 385
Self-citationFast logic?: Examining the time course assumption of dual process theory
Bago, B., & De Neys, W. (2017) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.014 · Cited by 346
Self-citationQuilty-Dunn, J., Porot, N., & Mandelbaum, E. (2023) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x22002849 · Cited by 205
Metadata
- Authors
- De Neys, W., Cromheeke, S., & Osman, M.
- Venue
- PLoS ONE
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2011-01-25
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- e15954
- ISSN
- 1932-6203 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2050734380
- Cited by
- 201
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 5.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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