Theory of Mind: Did Evolution Fool Us?
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to attribute mental states (e.g., beliefs and desires) to other people in order to understand and predict their behaviour. If others are rewarded to compete or cooperate with you, then what they will do depends upon what they believe about you. This is the reason why social interaction induces recursive ToM, of the sort "I think that you think that I think, etc.". Critically, recursion is the common notion behind the definition of sophistication of human language, strategic thinking in games, and, arguably, ToM. Although sophisticated ToM is believed to have high adaptive fitness, broad experimental evidence from behavioural economics, experimental psychology and linguistics point towards limited recursivity in representing other's beliefs. In this work, we test whether such apparent limitation may not in fact be proven to be adaptive, i.e. optimal in an evolutionary sense. First, we propose a meta-Bayesian approach that can predict the behaviour of ToM sophistication phenotypes who engage in social interactions. Second, we measure their adaptive fitness using evolutionary game theory. Our main contribution is to show that one does not have to appeal to biological costs to explain our limited ToM sophistication. In fact, the evolutionary cost/benefit ratio of ToM sophistication is non trivial. This is partly because an informational cost prevents highly sophisticated ToM phenotypes to fully exploit less sophisticated ones (in a competitive context). In addition, cooperation surprisingly favours lower levels of ToM sophistication. Taken together, these quantitative corollaries of the "social Bayesian brain" hypothesis provide an evolutionary account for both the limitation of ToM sophistication in humans as well as the persistence of low ToM sophistication levels.
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Cites
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“These describe the evolution of the frequency distribution of competing phenotypes over evolutionary time, given how well they perform when interacting with each other [55].”
BackgroundThe faculty of language: what is it, who has it, and how did it evolve?
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How to grow a mind: Statistics, structure, and abstraction
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A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game
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"Theory of Mind" in Schizophrenia: A Review of the Literature
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Variational free energy and the Laplace approximation
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“This has two implications: (i) one could relax this prior and effectively allow agents to adapt their effective ToM sophistication level, and (ii) one could think of evolution as selecting a very specific form of prior that defines classes of metaBayesian agents [42].”
Background
Cited by
Inferring on the intentions of others by hierarchical Bayesian learning
Diaconescu, A. O., Mathys, C., Weber, L. A. E., Daunizeau, J., Kasper, L., Lomakina, E. I., Fehr, E., & Stephan, K. E. (2014) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003810 · Cited by 219
Ardesch, D. J., Scholtens, L. H., Li, L., Preuss, T. M., Rilling, J. K., & van den Heuvel, M. P. (2019) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1818512116 · Cited by 152
Odeh, C. E., Gladfelter, A. L., Stoesser, C., & Roth, S. (2022) · International Journal of Developmental Disabilities · doi:10.1080/20473869.2020.1764241 · Cited by 51
“2003), which is consistent with theory of mind (Devaine et al. 2014).”
BackgroundNicotinic alteration of decision-making
Naudé, J., Dongelmans, M., & Faure, P. (2015) · Neuropharmacology · doi:10.1016/j.neuropharm.2014.11.021 · Cited by 39
“require inferential or reflective processes (Yu and Dayan, 2002, 2005; Devaine et al., 2014).”
What is theory of mind? A psychometric study of theory of mind and intelligence
Navarro, E. (2022) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101495 · Cited by 36
Metadata
- Authors
- Devaine, M., Hollard, G., & Daunizeau, J.
- Venue
- PLoS ONE
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2014-02-05
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- e87619
- ISSN
- 1932-6203 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2044171341
- Cited by
- 101
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 11.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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