Cited by 141Global Public Health Policies and EpidemiologyPharmaceutical industry and healthcarePolitical Influence and Corporate Strategies

The science for profit model—how and why corporations influence science and the use of science in policy and practice

Open access
Legg, Tess, Hatchard, Jenny, Gilmore, Anna B.·2021·PLoS ONE

Abstract

Science has been at the centre of attempts by major industries, including tobacco, chemical, and pharmaceutical, to delay progress in tackling threats to human and planetary health by, inter alia, obscuring industry harms, and opposing regulation. Some aspects of this influence are well documented, others remain poorly understood, and similarities between industries remain underexplored. This study, therefore, aims to synthesise the literature to develop an evidence-based typology and model of corporate influence on science in order to provide an overview of this multi-faceted phenomenon. We obtained literature examining corporate attempts to influence science and the use of science in policy and practice from: database searches, bibliographies, expert recommendations, and web alerts; using a modified scoping review methodology (n = 68). Through interpretive analysis we developed the Science for Profit Typology and Model. We identified eight corporate sectors repeatedly engaging in activities to influence science, including: manipulation of scientific methods; reshaping of criteria for establishing scientific "proof"; threats against scientists; and clandestine promotion of policy reforms that increase reliance on industry evidence. The typology identifies five macro-level strategies used consistently across the eight industries, comprising 19 meso-level strategies. The model shows how these strategies work to maximise the volume, credibility, reach, and use of industry-favourable science, while minimising these same aspects of industry-unfavourable science. This creates doubt about harms of industry products/practices or efficacy of policies affecting industry; promotes industry-favoured policy responses and industry products as solutions; and legitimises industry's role as scientific stakeholder. These efforts ultimately serve to weaken policy, prevent litigation, and maximise use of industry products/practices-maximising corporate profitability. We provide an accessible way to understand how and why corporations influence science, demonstrate the need for collective solutions, and discuss changes needed to ensure science works in the public interest.

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Authors
Legg, T., Hatchard, J., & Gilmore, A. B.
Affiliations
University of Bath (GB)
Corresponding author
Legg, Tess
Venue
PLoS ONE
Published
2021-06-23
Volume
16
Issue
6
Pages
e0253272
ISSN
1932-6203 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3176281018
Cited by
141
References
76
Citations by year
2026: 28 · 2025: 46 · 2024: 27 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 3
FWCI
16.24
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • PLoS ONE (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
  • South West Doctoral Training Partnership
  • Bloomberg Philanthropies’ STOP (Stopping Tobacco Organizations and Products) project funding
  • SPECTRUM (Shaping Public Health Policies to Reduce Inequalities and Harm) research consortium
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Global Public Health Policies and Epidemiology
  • Life Sciences › Pharmacology, Toxicology and Pharmaceutics › Pharmacology › Pharmaceutical industry and healthcare
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Keywords
corporate influence on science, industry influence on science, tobacco industry, chemical industry, pharmaceutical industry, scientific credibility, science and policy, science and practice, firm profitability
MeSH terms
Humans, Industry, Models, Theoretical, Science, Policy

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