Post-Quantum Authentication in TLS 1.3: A Performance Study
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The potential development of large-scale quantum computers is raising concerns among IT and security research professionals due to their ability to solve (elliptic curve) discrete logarithm and integer factorization problems in polynomial time.All currently used public key algorithms would be deemed insecure in a post-quantum (PQ) setting.In response, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has initiated a process to standardize quantum-resistant crypto algorithms, focusing primarily on their security guarantees.Since PQ algorithms present significant differences over classical ones, their overall evaluation should not be performed out-of-context.This work presents a detailed performance evaluation of the NIST signature algorithm candidates and investigates the imposed latency on TLS 1.3 connection establishment under realistic network conditions.In addition, we investigate their impact on TLS session throughput and analyze the trade-off between lengthy PQ signatures and computationally heavy PQ cryptographic operations.Our results demonstrate that the adoption of at least two PQ signature algorithms would be viable with little additional overhead over current signature algorithms.Also, we argue that many NIST PQ candidates can effectively be used for less timesensitive applications, and provide an in-depth discussion on the integration of PQ authentication in encrypted tunneling protocols, along with the related challenges, improvements, and alternatives.Finally, we propose and evaluate the combination of different PQ signature algorithms across the same certificate chain in TLS.Results show a reduction of the TLS handshake time and a significant increase of a server's TLS tunnel connection rate over using a single PQ signature scheme.
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Citations
Cites
Polynomial-time algorithms for prime factorization and discrete logarithms on a quantum computer
Shor, P. W. (1997) · SIAM Journal on Computing · doi:10.1137/s0097539795293172 · Cited by 8,472
Polynomial-time algorithms for prime factorization and discrete logarithms on a quantum computer
Shor, P. W. (1999) · SIAM Review · doi:10.1137/s0036144598347011 · Cited by 3,904
On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptography
Regev, O. (2009) · Journal of the ACM · doi:10.1145/1568318.1568324 · Cited by 2,315
NTRU: A ring-based public key cryptosystem
Hoffstein, J., Pipher, J., & Silverman, J. H. (1998) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/bfb0054868 · Cited by 1,947 · cited 4×
“The lattice problems NIST PQ signature candidates depend on are learning with errors (LWE) [77], ring learning with errors (RLWE) [59], module learning with rounding or errors (MLWR or MLWE) and NTRU [41].”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3
Rescorla, E. (2018) · doi:10.17487/rfc8446 · Cited by 1,897
CRYSTALS - Kyber: A CCA-Secure Module-Lattice-Based KEM
Bos, J., Ducas, L., Kiltz, E., Lepoint, T., Lyubashevsky, V., Schanck, J. M., Schwabe, P., Seiler, G., & Stehle, D. (2018) · 2018 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) · doi:10.1109/eurosp.2018.00032 · Cited by 1,192 · cited 1×
“On the other hand, the authors in [14], [79], [10, § 2.”
BackgroundCybersecurity in an Era with Quantum Computers: Will We Be Ready?
Mosca, M. (2018) · IEEE Security & Privacy · doi:10.1109/msp.2018.3761723 · Cited by 581
Shor's discrete logarithm quantum algorithm for elliptic curves
Proos, J., & Zalka, C. (2003) · Quantum Information and Computation · doi:10.26421/qic3.4-3 · Cited by 421
Laurie, B., Langley, A., & Kasper, E. (2013) · doi:10.17487/rfc6962 · Cited by 378
Status report on the first round of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process
Alagic, G., Alperin-Sheriff, J., Apon, D., Cooper, D., Dang, Q., Liu, Y.-K., Miller, C., Moody, D., Peralta, R., Perlner, R., et al. (2019) · doi:10.6028/nist.ir.8240 · Cited by 364 · cited 1×
“At the moment of this writing, NIST’s evaluation process has moved from Round 1 to Round 2 where 26 PQ algorithms were chosen with security guarantees being the primary criterion, while performance was treated as a future goal [2].”
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Cited by
Status report on the third round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization process
Alagic, G., Apon, D., Cooper, D., Dang, Q., Dang, T., Kelsey, J., Lichtinger, J., Liu, Y.-K., Miller, C., Moody, D., et al. (2022) · doi:10.6028/nist.ir.8413 · Cited by 395
Status report on the third round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization process
Alagic, G., Apon, D., Cooper, D., Dang, Q., Dang, T., Kelsey, J., Lichtinger, J., Liu, Y.-K., Miller, C., Moody, D., et al. (2022) · doi:10.6028/nist.ir.8413-upd1 · Cited by 301
Szymanski, T. H. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3169137 · Cited by 59
The Performance of Post-Quantum TLS 1.3
Sosnowski, M., Wiedner, F., Hauser, E., Steger, L., Schoinianakis, D., Gallenmüller, S., & Carle, G. (2023) · Companion of the 19th International Conference on emerging Networking EXperiments and Technologies · doi:10.1145/3624354.3630585 · Cited by 49
Sowa, J., Hoang, B., Yeluru, A., Qie, S., Nikolich, A., Iyer, R., & Cao, P. (2024) · 2024 IEEE International Conference on Quantum Computing and Engineering (QCE) · doi:10.1109/qce60285.2024.00213 · Cited by 15
Metadata
- Authors
- Sikeridis, D., Kampanakis, P., & Devetsikiotis, M.
- Venue
- Proceedings 2020 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium
- Publisher
- Internet Society
- Published
- 2020
- OpenAlex
- W3007841246
- Cited by
- 148
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 13.10
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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