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Cited by 231Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationEvolutionary Psychology and Human BehaviorExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation

Burnham, Terence C., Johnson, Dominic D. P.·2005·Analyse & Kritik
DOI 10.1515/auk-2005-0107
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Abstract

Human cooperation is held to be an evolutionary puzzle because people voluntarily engage in costly cooperation, and costly punishment of non-cooperators, even among anonymous strangers they will never meet again. The costs of such cooperation cannot be recovered through kin-selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, or costly signaling. A number of recent authors label this behavior ‘strong reciprocity’, and argue that it is: (a) a newly documented aspect of human nature, (b) adaptive, and (c) evolved by group selection. We argue exactly the opposite; that the phenomenon is: (a) not new, (b) maladaptive, and (c) evolved by individual selection. In our perspective, the apparent puzzle disappears to reveal a biological and evolutionary logic to human cooperation. Group selection may play a role in theory, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain human cooperation. Our alternative solution is simpler, makes fewer assumptions, and is more parsimonious with the empirical data.

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Metadata

Authors
Burnham, T. C., & Johnson, D. D. P.
ORCID
Venue
Analyse & Kritik
Publisher
Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Published
2005-05-01
Volume
27
Issue
1
Pages
113-135
ISSN
  • 0171-5860 (ISSN-L)
  • 2365-9858
DOI
10.1515/auk-2005-0107
OpenAlex
W1587383510
Cited by
231
References
49
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 12 · 2015: 16 · 2014: 10 · 2013: 15 · 2012: 28
FWCI
32.79
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Analyse & Kritik (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Keywords
human cooperation, strong reciprocity, costly punishment, costly cooperation, group selection, individual selection, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, costly signaling, evolution of cooperation

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