Cited by 231Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationEvolutionary Psychology and Human BehaviorExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

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The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation

Burnham, Terence C., Johnson, Dominic D. P.·2005·Analyse & Kritik

DOI 10.1515/auk-2005-0107

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Abstract

Human cooperation is held to be an evolutionary puzzle because people voluntarily engage in costly cooperation, and costly punishment of non-cooperators, even among anonymous strangers they will never meet again. The costs of such cooperation cannot be recovered through kin-selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, or costly signaling. A number of recent authors label this behavior ‘strong reciprocity’, and argue that it is: (a) a newly documented aspect of human nature, (b) adaptive, and (c) evolved by group selection. We argue exactly the opposite; that the phenomenon is: (a) not new, (b) maladaptive, and (c) evolved by individual selection. In our perspective, the apparent puzzle disappears to reveal a biological and evolutionary logic to human cooperation. Group selection may play a role in theory, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain human cooperation. Our alternative solution is simpler, makes fewer assumptions, and is more parsimonious with the empirical data.

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Authors: Burnham, T. C., & Johnson, D. D. P.
ORCID: Burnham, Terence C.
Johnson, Dominic D. P.
Venue: Analyse & Kritik
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Published: 2005-05-01
Volume: 27
Issue: 1
Pages: 113-135
ISSN: 0171-5860 (ISSN-L)
2365-9858
DOI: 10.1515/auk-2005-0107
OpenAlex: W1587383510
Cited by: 231
References: 49
Citations by year: 2026: 2 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 12 · 2015: 16 · 2014: 10 · 2013: 15 · 2012: 28
FWCI: 32.79
Type: journal article
Language: en
Open access: closed
Locations: Analyse & Kritik (publishedVersion)
Topics: Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Keywords: human cooperation, strong reciprocity, costly punishment, costly cooperation, group selection, individual selection, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, costly signaling, evolution of cooperation

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The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation

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