Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 46 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We present Tor, a circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication service. This Onion Routing system addresses limitations in the earlier design by adding perfect forward secrecy, congestion control, directory servers, integrity checking, configurable exit policies, anticensorship features, guard nodes, application- and user-selectable stream isolation, and a practical design for location-hidden services via rendezvous points. Tor is deployed on the real-world Internet, requires no special privileges or kernel modifications, requires little synchronization or coordination between nodes, and provides a reasonable tradeoff between anonymity, usability, and efficiency. An earlier paper in 2004 described Tor’s original design; here we explain Tor’s current design as of late 2012, and describe our experiences with an international network of approximately 3000 nodes and 500000 users. We close with a list of open problems in anonymous communication.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“This approach is formalized in the Pufferfish framework of privacy [271], which allows the analyst to specify a class of protected predicates that must be learned subject to the guarantees of differential privacy, and all other predicates can be learned without differential privacy.”
From Advances and Open Problems in Federated Learning (2021) · cites this paper as [271]
Citations
Cites
Douceur, J. R. (2002) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-45748-8_24 · Cited by 4,419 · cited 2×
“Many of the open problems in low-latency anonymity networks, such as generating dummy traffic or preventing Sybil attacks [22], may be solvable independently from the issues solved by Tor.”
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Chaum, D. L. (1981) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/358549.358563 · Cited by 4,289
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
Reiter, M. K., & Rubin, A. D. (1998) · ACM Transactions on Information and System Security · doi:10.1145/290163.290168 · Cited by 1,770 · cited 5×
“While Tarzan and MorphMix use layered encryption as above, Crowds [42] simply assumes an adversary who cannot observe the initiator: it uses no public-key encryption, so any node on a circuit can read users’ traffic.”
InfluentialDierks, T., & Allen, C. (1999) · doi:10.17487/rfc2246 · Cited by 1,654 · cited 14×
“The identity key is used to sign TLS certificates, to sign the OR’s router descriptor (a summary of its keys, address, bandwidth, exit policy, and so on), and (by directory servers) to sign directories.”
InfluentialWide-area cooperative storage with CFS
Dabek, F., Kaashoek, M. F., Karger, D., Morris, R., & Stoica, I. (2001) · Proceedings of the eighteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles · doi:10.1145/502034.502054 · Cited by 1,428
Anonymous connections and onion routing
Reed, M. G., Syverson, P. F., & Goldschlag, D. M. (1998) · IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications · doi:10.1109/49.668972 · Cited by 1,063
Self-citationTarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Freedman, M. J., & Morris, R. (2002) · Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/586110.586137 · Cited by 663 · cited 3×
“They may intercept IP packets directly, and relay them whole (stripping the source address) along the circuit [8, 24].”
Mixminion: design of a type III anonymous remailer protocol
Danezis, G., Dingledine, R., & Mathewson, N. (2004) · Proceedings 19th International Conference on Data Engineering (Cat. No.03CH37405) · doi:10.1109/secpri.2003.1199323 · Cited by 658 · cited 2×
“All of these approaches limit exposure even when some selected users collude in the DoS.”
Self-citationGoldschlag, D. M., Reed, M. G., & Syverson, P. F. (1996) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-61996-8_37 · Cited by 494 · cited 3×
“No mixing, padding, or traffic shaping (yet): Onion Routing originally called for batching and reordering cells as they arrived, assumed padding between ORs, and in later designs added padding between onion proxies (users) and ORs [27, 41].”
Self-citationThe NRL Protocol Analyzer: An Overview
Meadows, C. (1996) · The Journal of Logic Programming · doi:10.1016/0743-1066(95)00095-x · Cited by 459
Cited by
Items 301–400 of 1,001
Empirical analysis of Tor Hidden Services
Owen, G., & Savage, N. (2015) · IET Information Security · doi:10.1049/iet-ifs.2015.0121 · Cited by 83
Spoiled Onions: Exposing Malicious Tor Exit Relays
Winter, P., Köwer, R., Mulazzani, M., Huber, M., Schrittwieser, S., Lindskog, S., & Weippl, E. R. (2014) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-08506-7_16 · Cited by 106
Darknet traffic classification and adversarial attacks using machine learning
Rust-Nguyen, N., Sharma, S. S., & Stamp, M. (2023) · Computers & security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2023.103098 · Cited by 61
“Tor then deletes the temporary session keys used for encryption at each node, so that any subsequently compromised nodes cannot decrypt old traffic ( Dingledine et al., 2004 ).”
Abbott, T. G., Lai, K. J., Lieberman, M. R., & Price, E. C. (2007) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-75551-7_12 · Cited by 82
“Tor [5] is an anonymizing protocol that uses onion routing to hide the source of TCP traffic.”
A distributed k-anonymity protocol for location privacy
Zhong, G., & Hengartner, U. (2009) · IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications · doi:10.1109/percom.2009.4912774 · Cited by 82
Black SDN for the Internet of Things
Chakrabarty, S., Engels, D. W., & Thathapudi, S. (2015) · 2015 IEEE 12th International Conference on Mobile Ad Hoc and Sensor Systems · doi:10.1109/mass.2015.100 · Cited by 75
(2020) · The International Library of Ethics, Law and Technology · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-29053-5 · Cited by 66
Schuchard, M., Geddes, J., Thompson, C., & Hopper, N. (2012) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/2382196.2382209 · Cited by 81
“The mostly widely deployed censor-ship resistance tools used today combine proxies and encrypted tunnels, examples of which include Tor [9], JAP [3], and Ultra-surf [7].”
MethodEvaluating Bluetooth as a Medium for Botnet Command and Control
Singh, K., Sangal, S., Jain, N., Traynor, P., & Lee, W. (2010) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-14215-4_4 · Cited by 80
“If the very low volume of traffic is not sufficient for avoiding detection, such bots can further obfuscate their activities through a number of anonymizing techniques ranging from Tor [11] and Publius [35] to the use of a free temporary email address.”
MethodZero-delay Lightweight Defenses against Website Fingerprinting
Gong, J., & Wang, T. (2020) · National University of Singapore · Cited by 235
PIR-Tor: scalable anonymous communication using private information retrieval
Mittal, P., Olumofin, F., Troncoso, C., Borisov, N., & Goldberg, I. (2011) · Cited by 80
Rerandomizable RCCA Encryption
Prabhakaran, M., & Rosulek, M. (2007) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-74143-5_29 · Cited by 79
“This problem is somewhat similar to “Onion Routing” [5,12,16,21].”
ResultA New Replay Attack Against Anonymous Communication Networks
Pries, R., Yu, W., Fu, X., & Zhao, W. (2008) · International Conference on Communications · doi:10.1109/icc.2008.305 · Cited by 85
Making p2p accountable without losing privacy
Belenkiy, M., Chase, M., Erway, C. C., Jannotti, J., Küpçü, A., Lysyanskaya, A., & Rachlin, E. (2007) · ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES) · doi:10.1145/1314333.1314339 · Cited by 80
“anonymous remailing) [11, 23, 18], participants route their messages through”
BackgroundImproving Efficiency and Simplicity of Tor Circuit Establishment and Hidden Services
Øverlier, L., & Syverson, P. F. (2007) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-75551-7_9 · Cited by 82
Self-citationA Decentralized Privacy Preserving Reputation Protocol for the Malicious Adversarial Model
Hasan, O., Brunie, L., Bertino, E., & Shang, N. (2013) · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · doi:10.1109/tifs.2013.2258914 · Cited by 83
Congestion-Aware Path Selection for Tor
Wang, T., Bauer, K. S., Forero, C., & Goldberg, I. (2012) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-32946-3_9 · Cited by 79
Wang, Q., Gong, X., Nguyen, G. T. K., Houmansadr, A., & Borisov, N. (2012) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/2382196.2382212 · Cited by 78
“Limiting the amount of information each user gets and trying to identify compromised insiders can partially mitigate this attack [51, 52, 56]; however, these techniques are unlikely to survive a powerful adversary who can deploy a very large number of corrupt users.”
BackgroundMethodEnhancing Tor's performance using real-time traffic classification
AlSabah, M., Bauer, K. S., & Goldberg, I. (2012) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/2382196.2382208 · Cited by 100
Privacy enhancing identity management: protection against re-identification and profiling
Clauβ, S., Kesdoğan, D., & Kölsch, T. (2005) · doi:10.1145/1102486.1102501 · Cited by 92
“Thereby, we concentrate on attacks on linkability and identi.ability, and possible protection methods.”
MethodNgan, T., Dingledine, R., & Wallach, D. S. (2010) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-14577-3_19 · Cited by 83
Self-citationA survey of privacy in multi-agent systems
Such, J. M., Espinosa, A., & García‐Fornes, A. (2013) · The Knowledge Engineering Review · doi:10.1017/s0269888913000180 · Cited by 103
“An example of implementation of onion routing is Tor (Dingledine et al., 2004).”
BackgroundWebsite Fingerprinting Defenses at the Application Layer
Cherubin, G., Hayes, J., & Juarez, M. (2017) · Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies · doi:10.1515/popets-2017-0023 · Cited by 104
“Tor routes a client’s traffic through volunteer relays before connecting to the communication’s destination, so that local eavesdroppers cannot link both sender and receiver of the communication [8].”
BackgroundAtom: Horizontally Scaling Strong Anonymity
Kwon, A., Corrigan-Gibbs, H., Devadas, S., & Ford, B. (2017) · ACM SIGOPS Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP) · doi:10.1145/3132747.3132755 · Cited by 110
“Tor consists of a network of volunteer relays, and increasing the number of these relays increases the overall capacity of the network.”
BackgroundInfluentialExperiences with CoralCDN: a five-year operational view
Freedman, M. J. (2010) · doi:10.5555/1855711.1855718 · Cited by 77
Nymble: Anonymous IP-Address Blocking
Johnson, P. C., Kapadia, A. C., Tsang, P. P., & Smith, S. W. (2007) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-75551-7_8 · Cited by 78
Website Fingerprinting Attack on Anonymity Networks Based on Profile Hidden Markov Model
Zhuo, Z., Zhang, Y., Zhang, Z.-L., Zhang, X., & Zhang, J. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · doi:10.1109/tifs.2017.2762825 · Cited by 87
A Decentralized Peer-to-Peer Remote Health Monitoring System
Ali, M. S., Vecchio, M., Putra, G. D., Kanhere, S. S., & Antonelli, F. (2020) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s20061656 · Cited by 85
“Tor is a decentralized, privacy enhancing system designed to prevent traffic analysis attacks [15].”
BackgroundServing Ads from localhost for Performance, Privacy, and Profit
Guha, S., Reznichenko, A., Tang, K., Haddadi, H., & Francis, P. (2009) · Cited by 76
Recruiting new tor relays with BRAIDS
Jansen, R., Hopper, N., & Kim, Y. (2010) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/1866307.1866344 · Cited by 88
OB-PWS: Obfuscation-Based Private Web Search
Balsa, E., Troncoso, C., & Díaz, C. (2012) · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) · doi:10.1109/sp.2012.36 · Cited by 76
Secure Logging as a Service—Delegating Log Management to the Cloud
Ray, I., Belyaev, K., Strizhov, M., Mulamba, D., & Rajaram, M. (2013) · IEEE Systems Journal · doi:10.1109/jsyst.2012.2221958 · Cited by 86
Anonymity Trilemma: Strong Anonymity, Low Bandwidth Overhead, Low Latency - Choose Two
Das, D., Meiser, S., Mohammadi, E., & Kate, A. (2018) · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) · doi:10.1109/sp.2018.00011 · Cited by 118
The Loopix Anonymity SystemPreprint
Piotrowska, A. M., Hayes, J., Elahi, T., Meiser, S., & Danezis, G. (2017) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1703.00536 · Cited by 76
Censored Planet: An Internet-wide, Longitudinal Censorship Observatory
Sundara Raman, R., Shenoy, P., Kohls, K., & Ensafi, R. (2020) · Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3372297.3417883 · Cited by 75
“The literature on censorship circumvention is also rich with work on both long-standing systems such as Tor [33], and newer systems using packet manipulation strategies [18, 83, 107], crowdsourcing [67], and strategies to disguise the destination [42, 49, 114, 115].”
BackgroundHaddadi, H., Hui, P., & Brown, I. (2010) · Mobility in the Evolving Internet Architecture · doi:10.1145/1859983.1859993 · Cited by 75
“To further protect users against attempts to link reports to user behaviour, we are taking a similar approach to onion routing [6] using the DTN paradigm.”
MethodRobust Multi-tab Website Fingerprinting Attacks in the Wild
Deng, X.-H., Yin, Q., Liu, Z., Zhao, X., Li, Q., Xu, M.-W., Xu, K., & Wu, J.-P. (2023) · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp46215.2023.10179464 · Cited by 115
“Tor hides user activities by establishing browsing sessions through Tor circuits with randomly selected Tor relays, where data communication in each Tor circuit is encrypted via ephemeral keys and forwarded in fix-sized cells [2].”
Current Events: Identifying Webpages by Tapping the Electrical Outlet
Clark, S. S., Mustafa, H. A., Ransford, B., Sorber, J. M., Fu, K. E., & Xu, W. (2013) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-40203-6_39 · Cited by 76
“Based on the classifier’s reduced performance when using Coral, we evaluated Tor [7] configured as a local SOCKS proxy.”
MethodRevocable Quantum Timed-Release Encryption
Unruh, D. (2014) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-55220-5_8 · Cited by 102
Inside Job: Applying Traffic Analysis to Measure Tor from Within
Jansen, R., Juarez, M., Gálvez, R., Elahi, T., & Díaz, C. (2018) · Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2018.23261 · Cited by 89
Proactively Accountable Anonymous Messaging in Verdict
Corrigan-Gibbs, H., Wolinsky, D. I., & Ford, B. (2012) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1209.4819 · Cited by 68
“Crowds [40], LAP [27], Mixminion [16], Tarzan [21], and Tor [18], provide anonymity in large networks, but these systems cannot protect against adversaries that observe traffic [4, 35] or perform active attacks [9] on a large fraction of network links.”
BackgroundInfluentialProtecting Location Privacy for Task Allocation in Ad Hoc Mobile Cloud Computing
Gong, Y., Zhang, C., Fang, Y. M., & Sun, J. (2015) · IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing · doi:10.1109/tetc.2015.2490021 · Cited by 76
“The influence of such leakage can be mitigated by hiding its identity, which is done in Tor [33].”
BackgroundDarkweb Cyber Threat Intelligence Mining
Robertson, J. W., Diab, A., Marin, E., Nunes, E., Paliath, V., Shakarian, J., & Shakarian, P. (2017) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316888513 · Cited by 77
A view on privacy & trust in IoT
Daubert, J., Wiesmaier, A., & Kikiras, P. K. (2015) · IEEE International Conference on Communications workshops · doi:10.1109/iccw.2015.7247581 · Cited by 97
Decaptcha: breaking 75% of eBay audio CAPTCHAs
Bursztein, E., & Bethard, S. J. (2009) · Cited by 74
Revocable Quantum Timed-Release Encryption
Unruh, D. (2015) · Journal of the ACM · doi:10.1145/2817206 · Cited by 110
“Think, e.g., of a client connecting to a server in an anonymous fashion, e.g., through (a quantum variant of) TOR [11], and receiving some data m .”
BackgroundOTPaaS—One Time Password as a Service
Erdem, E., & Sandıkkaya, M. T. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · doi:10.1109/tifs.2018.2866025 · Cited by 91
The quest for a killer app for opportunistic and delay tolerant networks
Lindgren, A., & Hui, P. (2009) · ACM Workshop on Challenged Networks (CHANTS) · doi:10.1145/1614222.1614233 · Cited by 73
Tor traffic analysis and detection via machine learning techniques
Cuzzocrea, A., Martinelli, F., Mercaldo, F., & Vercelli, G. (2017) · IEEE International Conference on Big Data (BigData) · doi:10.1109/bigdata.2017.8258487 · Cited by 86
“The dataset is available for research purpose 4 .”
BackgroundRealistic Website Fingerprinting By Augmenting Network Traces
Bahramali, A., Bozorgi, A., & Houmansadr, A. (2023) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/3576915.3616639 · Cited by 114
“Tor [11] is the most popular anonymous communication system in the wild with several million daily users [39].”
BackgroundMulti-flow attacks against network flow watermarking schemes
Kiyavash, N., Houmansadr, A., & Borisov, N. (2008) · Cited by 73
New Techniques for Private Stream Searching
Bethencourt, J., Song, D. X., & Waters, B. R. (2009) · ACM Transactions on Information and System Security · doi:10.1145/1455526.1455529 · Cited by 73
ExperimenTor: A Testbed for Safe and Realistic Tor Experimentation
Bauer, K. S., McCoy, D., Sherr, M., & Grunwald, D. C. (2012) · Cited by 73
ValueShuffle: Mixing Confidential Transactions for Comprehensive Transaction Privacy in Bitcoin
Ruffing, T., & Moreno-Sanchez, P. (2017) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-70278-0_8 · Cited by 73
“For providing unlinkability of inputs and outputs in a CoinJoin transaction, ValueShuffle does not rely on any external anonymous channel such as the Tor network [11].”
MethodPrivacy and Data Protection by Design - from policy to engineering
Danezis, G., Domingo-Ferrer, J., Hansen, M., Hoepman, J.-H., Metayer, D., Tirtea, R., & Schiffner, S. (2014) · UCL Discovery (University College London) · doi:10.2824/38623 · Cited by 278
“The currently popular Tor service [81] has over 5000 such relays and serves over 1 million users per day.”
BackgroundShroud: ensuring private access to large-scale data in the data center
Lorch, J. R., Parno, B. J., Mickens, J. W., Raykova, M., & Schiffman, J. (2013) · File and Storage Technologies · doi:10.5555/2591272.2591294 · Cited by 72
“If desired, users can mitigate this risk via standard techniques [9].”
BackgroundHydRand: Efficient Continuous Distributed Randomness
Schindler, P., Judmayer, A., Stifter, N., & Weippl, E. R. (2020) · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) · doi:10.1109/sp40000.2020.00003 · Cited by 74
The Impact of Unlinkability on Adversarial Community Detection: Effects and Countermeasures
Nagaraja, S. (2010) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-14527-8_15 · Cited by 82
“In the context of communication channels, anonymity is described in terms of the channel properties of unlinkability and un-observability , with many schemes as well as deployed systems [8, 10] focusing their efforts on providing the former property.”
BackgroundA historical probability based noise generation strategy for privacy protection in cloud computing
Zhang, G., Yang, Y. J., & Chen, J. (2011) · Journal of Computer and System Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.jcss.2011.12.020 · Cited by 79
What’s Clicking What? Techniques and Innovations of Today’s Clickbots
Miller, B., Pearce, P., Grier, C., Kreibich, C., & Paxson, V. (2011) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-22424-9_10 · Cited by 72
Network activity analysis of CryptoWall ransomware
Cabaj, K. (2015) · PRZEGLĄD ELEKTROTECHNICZNY · doi:10.15199/48.2015.11.48 · Cited by 71
DefenestraTor: Throwing Out Windows in Tor
AlSabah, M., Bauer, K. S., Goldberg, I., Grunwald, D. C., McCoy, D., Savage, S., & Voelker, G. M. (2011) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-22263-4_8 · Cited by 71
Efficient anonymity-preserving data collection
Brickell, J., & Shmatikov, V. (2006) · ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) · doi:10.1145/1150402.1150415 · Cited by 93
Characterizing privacy leakage of public WiFi networks for users on travel
Cheng, N., Wang, X. O., Cheng, W., Mohapatra, P., & Seneviratne, A. P. (2013) · IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM) · doi:10.1109/infcom.2013.6567086 · Cited by 71
An Empirical Evaluation of Relay Selection in Tor.
Wacek, C., Tan, H., Bauer, K. S., & Sherr, M. (2013) · Cited by 71
Muthiah, S., Butler, P. J., Khandpur, R. P., Saraf, P., Self, N., Rozovskaya, A., Zhao, L., Cadena, J., Lu, C., Vullikanti, A. K. S., et al. (2016) · ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) · doi:10.1145/2939672.2939709 · Cited by 70
“It uses classical statistical models (LASSO and hybrid regression models) to forecast civil unrest events using features from social media (Twitter and blogs), news sources, political event databases (ICEWS and GDELT [10]), Tor [4] statistics, food prices, and currency exchange rates.”
MethodEvading Censorship with Browser-Based Proxies
Fifield, D., Hardison, N., Ellithorpe, J., Stark, E., Boneh, D., Dingledine, R., & Porras, P. A. (2012) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-31680-7_13 · Cited by 82
Self-citationDependent link padding algorithms for low latency anonymity systems
Wang, W., Motani, M., & Srinivasan, V. (2008) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/1455770.1455812 · Cited by 79
Robust Website Fingerprinting Through the Cache Occupancy ChannelPreprint
Shusterman, A., Kang, L., Haskal, Y., Meltser, Y., Mittal, P., Oren, Y., & Yarom, Y. (2018) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.21227/249a-3f26 · Cited by 98
Burnett (2015) · doi:10.1145/2785956.2787485 · Cited by 69
Privacy and Access Control for Outsourced Personal Records
Maffei, M., Malavolta, G., Reinert, M., & Schröder, D. (2015) · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) · doi:10.1109/sp.2015.28 · Cited by 72
Secure personal data servers: a vision paper
Allard, T., Anciaux, N., Bouganim, L., Guo, Y., Le Folgoc, L., Nguyen, B., Pucheral, P., Ray, I., Ray, I., & Yin, S. (2010) · Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment · doi:10.14778/1920841.1920850 · Cited by 65
Internet Censorship detection: A survey
Aceto, G., & Pescapè, A. (2015) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2015.03.008 · Cited by 87
Denial of Service or Denial of Security? How Attacks on Reliability can Compromise Anonymity
Borisov, N., Danezis, G., Mittal, P., & Tabriz, P. (2007) · Cited by 69
Ethics in cryptomarket research
Martin, J. A., & Christin, N. (2016) · International Journal of Drug Policy · doi:10.1016/j.drugpo.2016.05.006 · Cited by 69
Garcia, F. D., Hasuo, I., Pieters, W., & van Rossum, P. (2005) · Formal Methods in Security Engineering · doi:10.1145/1103576.1103585 · Cited by 69
Garrido, G. M., Sedlmeir, J., Uludağ, Ö., Alaoui, I. S., Luckow, A., & Matthes, F. (2022) · Journal of Network and Computer Applications · doi:10.1016/j.jnca.2022.103465 · Cited by 97
Measuring and Mitigating AS-level Adversaries Against Tor
Nithyanand, R., Starov, O., Zair, A., Gill, P., & Schapira, M. (2016) · Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2016.23322 · Cited by 68
Anonymity and one-way authentication in key exchange protocols
Goldberg, I., Stebila, D., & Ustaoğlu, B. (2012) · Designs Codes and Cryptography · doi:10.1007/s10623-011-9604-z · Cited by 72
“This is an important goal for practical applications such as the Tor anonymity network [15].”
BackgroundTwo tales of privacy in online social networks
Gürses, S. F., & Díaz, C. (2013) · IEEE Security & Privacy · doi:10.1109/msp.2013.47 · Cited by 72
How much anonymity does network latency leak?
Hopper, N., Vasserman, E. Y., & Chan‐Tin, E. (2007) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/1315245.1315257 · Cited by 68
Distributed ONS and its Impact on Privacy
Fabian, B., & Günther, O. (2007) · International Conference on Communications · doi:10.1109/icc.2007.207 · Cited by 68
One-click hosting services: a file-sharing hideout
Antoniades, D., Markatos, E. P., & Dovrolis, C. (2009) · ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC) · doi:10.1145/1644893.1644920 · Cited by 75
A pattern language for developing privacy enhancing technologies
Hafiz, M. (2011) · Software Practice and Experience · doi:10.1002/spe.1131 · Cited by 81
“Tor [14] initiators can direct traffic to exit partway down the circuit, by using in-band signaling within the circuit.”
BackgroundAnoA: A Framework for Analyzing Anonymous Communication Protocols
Michael Backes, A., Kate, A., Manoharan, P., Meiser, S., & Mohammadi, E. (2013) · IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW) · doi:10.1109/csf.2013.18 · Cited by 71
Usability of anonymous web browsing
Clark, J., van Oorschot, P. C., & Adams, C. M. (2007) · Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security · doi:10.1145/1280680.1280687 · Cited by 67
Privacy-Preserving Queries over Relational Databases
Olumofin, F., & Goldberg, I. (2010) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-14527-8_5 · Cited by 81
“For the front running example, the user could tunnel the query through Tor [16] to preserve the privacy of his or her network address.”
BackgroundInfluentialDP5: A Private Presence Service
Borisov, N., Danezis, G., & Goldberg, I. (2015) · Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies · doi:10.1515/popets-2015-0008 · Cited by 86
Surfacing collaborated networks in dark web to find illicit and criminal content
Zulkarnine, A. T., Frank, R. W., Monk, B., Mitchell, J., & Davies, G. J. (2016) · IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI) · doi:10.1109/isi.2016.7745452 · Cited by 67
A New Hybrid Machine Learning for Cybersecurity Threat Detection Based on Adaptive Boosting
Sornsuwit, P., & Jaiyen, S. (2019) · Applied Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1080/08839514.2019.1582861 · Cited by 84
“One major attack that evades firewalls and IDS/IPS is Tor or “ The Onion Router ” which is a distributed overlay network designed to anonymize TCP-based applications like web browsing, secure shell, and instant messaging (Dingledine, Mathewson, and Syverson 2004).”
BackgroundPrivacy patterns for online interactions
Romanosky, S., Acquisti, A., Hong, J., Cranor, L. F., & Friedman, B. (2006) · Conference on Pattern Languages of Programs · doi:10.1145/1415472.1415486 · Cited by 68
Jansen, R., & Johnson, A. (2016) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/2976749.2978310 · Cited by 71
“The Tor network [10] is among the most popular tools for digital privacy.”
BackgroundFormal Treatment of Privacy-Enhancing Credential Systems
Camenisch, J., Krenn, S., Lehmann, A., Mikkelsen, G. L., Neven, G., & Pedersen, M. Ø. (2016) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-31301-6_1 · Cited by 65
“Of course, additional measures must be taken to guarantee anonymity on all communication layers, such as using an onion routing protocol like Tor [DMS04] to hide network addresses and prevent traffic analysis.”
BackgroundEnhancing Security and Privacy of Tor's Ecosystem by Using Trusted Execution Environments
Kim, S., Han, J., Ha, J., Kim, T., & Han, D. (2017) · Networked Systems Design and Implementation · Cited by 65
DarkBERT: A Language Model for the Dark Side of the Internet
Jin, Y., Jang, E., Cui, J., Chung, J.-W., Lee, Y., & Shin, S. (2023) · Proceedings of the conference - Association for Computational Linguistics. Meeting · doi:10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.415 · Cited by 93
Antisocial Networks: Turning a Social Network into a Botnet
Athanasopoulos, E., Makridakis, A., Antonatos, S., Antoniades, D., Ioannidis, S., Anagnostakis, K. G., & Markatos, E. P. (2008) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-85886-7_10 · Cited by 78
“We ignored the fact that some Facebook users might be using some sort of an anonymizing system like TOR [14], because our goal was not to capture the origin of the users, but the origin of the requests, which were recorded by our victim host.”
BackgroundSoK: Towards Grounding Censorship Circumvention in Empiricism
Tschantz, M. C., Afroz, S., request, N. W. O., & Paxson, V. (2016) · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) · doi:10.1109/sp.2016.59 · Cited by 65
Compressive Traffic Analysis: A New Paradigm for Scalable Traffic Analysis
Nasr, M., Houmansadr, A., & Mazumdar, A. (2017) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/3133956.3134074 · Cited by 100
Lu, D., Yurek, T., Kulshreshtha, S., Govind, R., Kate, A., & Miller, A. K. (2019) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/3319535.3354238 · Cited by 107
Overlay networks and the future of the internet
Clark, D., Lehr, B., Bauer, S., Faratin, P., Sami, R., & Wroclawski, J. T. (2006) · Cited by 65
Metadata
- Authors
- Dingledine, R., Mathewson, N., & Syverson, P.
- Affiliations
- United States Naval Research Laboratory (US)
- Publisher
- Defense Technical Information Center
- Published
- 2004-01-01
- OpenAlex
- W1655958391
- Cited by
- 4,104
- References
- 46
- Citations by year
- 2026: 85 · 2025: 162 · 2024: 167 · 2023: 176 · 2022: 158 · 2021: 195 · 2020: 191 · 2019: 167 · 2018: 221 · 2017: 215 · 2016: 264 · 2015: 280 · 2014: 256 · 2013: 253 · 2012: 270
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Peer-to-Peer Network Technologies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Privacy, Security, and Data Protection
- Keywords
- Tor, onion routing, anonymous communication, forward secrecy, congestion control, directory servers, integrity verification, exit policy, rendezvous points, anonymity, network latency
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.