Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router
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Abstract
We present Tor, a circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication service. This Onion Routing system addresses limitations in the earlier design by adding perfect forward secrecy, congestion control, directory servers, integrity checking, configurable exit policies, anticensorship features, guard nodes, application- and user-selectable stream isolation, and a practical design for location-hidden services via rendezvous points. Tor is deployed on the real-world Internet, requires no special privileges or kernel modifications, requires little synchronization or coordination between nodes, and provides a reasonable tradeoff between anonymity, usability, and efficiency. An earlier paper in 2004 described Tor’s original design; here we explain Tor’s current design as of late 2012, and describe our experiences with an international network of approximately 3000 nodes and 500000 users. We close with a list of open problems in anonymous communication.
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“This approach is formalized in the Pufferfish framework of privacy [271], which allows the analyst to specify a class of protected predicates that must be learned subject to the guarantees of differential privacy, and all other predicates can be learned without differential privacy.”
From Advances and Open Problems in Federated Learning (2021) · cites this paper as [271]
Citations
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MethodPrivacy-Enhancing Technologies
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Covert channel vulnerabilities in anonymity systems
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“The weaknesses are that side channel attacks exist including timing attacks [3], packet counting attacks [4], and intersection attacks [5] that can reveal the source and destination nodes of a communication stream.”
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“Consequently, several solutions emerged, a key example of which is Tor [14].”
BackgroundUsing Traffic Analysis to Identify the Second Generation Onion Router
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Throttling Tor Bandwidth Parasites
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BackgroundA Privacy-Preserving Buyer–Seller Watermarking Protocol Based on Priced Oblivious Transfer
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In search of an anonymous and secure lookup
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“We do not believe there is any fundamental difference between such an attack in Alibi Routing and other systems, and so traditional approaches apply (e.g., white-listing sources or destinations, as in Tor [10], and rate-limiting how much a peer contributes to the system, as in BitTorrent [9]).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialUser Profiling in the Time of HTTPS
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BackgroundPinMe: Tracking a Smartphone User around the World
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“First, flightTracker returns the destination airport from which the current city can be identified even if the user has not connected to any WiFi network yet or is using an anonymous communication service, e.g., Tor [54].”
BackgroundSecurity Analysis of the Object Name Service
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“1) Selective Denial-of-Service Attack: A threat to anonymous communication systems (like Tor [41]), the selective Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack [42], can increase the chance of compromising anonymous circuits by selectively dropping packets to tear down the circuits that are infeasible to…”
BackgroundBitcoin: Perils of an Unregulated Global P2P Currency
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“Silk Road was only accessible as a TOR hidden service [6], thereby preventing users from discovering the IP address of the site, and also preventing outside observers from discovering that a particular user had accessed the site.”
BackgroundLinkMirage: Enabling Privacy-preserving Analytics on Social Relationships
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Tor Traffic Classification from Raw Packet Header using Convolutional Neural Network
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“1, as input values of our CNN model due to the fact that TCP carries about 90 percent of all the Internet traffic as well as Tor traffic works on TCP streams [2].”
BackgroundAnte, L., Fischer, C., & Strehle, E. (2022) · Journal of Manufacturing Systems · doi:10.1016/j.jmsy.2022.01.005 · Cited by 49
“…and enforcement, including policy-related questions (Ben-Sasson et al., 2014), 3) research on the Tor network, such as its scalability, bandwidth classes, incentives and approaches to limiting abuse (Dingledine et al., 2004), and 4) research on public-key cryptography (Miers et al., 2013).”
BackgroundBlind evaluation of location based queries using space transformation to preserve location privacy
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“Repeated abuse has led service providers (SPs) like Wikipedia to ban access though anonymizing networks such as Tor [15].”
BackgroundPredicted Packet Padding for Anonymous Web Browsing Against Traffic Analysis Attacks
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Blind Payment Protocol for Payment Channel Networks
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“We call hidden graph network a network the topology of which is hidden from all of its members, i.e. connections are established either via some external medium or by using hiding peer-discovery protocol similar to that of limited directory querying, implemented in Tor network [11].”
MethodThe rise of website fingerprinting on Tor: Analysis on techniques and assumptions
Aminuddin, M. A. I. M., Zaaba, Z. F., Samsudin, A., Zaki, F., & Anuar, N. B. (2023) · Journal of Network and Computer Applications · doi:10.1016/j.jnca.2023.103582 · Cited by 48
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BackgroundPrivate Web Search with Malicious Adversaries
Lindell, Y., & Waisbard, E. (2010) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-14527-8_13 · Cited by 40
rBridge: User Reputation based Tor Bridge Distribution with Privacy Preservation.
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Privacy-Utility Tradeoffs in Routing Cryptocurrency over Payment Channel Networks
Tang, W., Wang, W., Fanti, G. C., & Oh, S. (2020) · Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3392147 · Cited by 36
Informant: Detecting Sybils Using Incentives
Margolin, N. B., & Levine, B. N. (2007) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-77366-5_18 · Cited by 40
A Framework for Privacy-Preserving Mobile Payment on Security Enhanced ARM TrustZone Platforms
Pirker, M., & Slamanig, D. (2012) · IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom) · doi:10.1109/trustcom.2012.28 · Cited by 36
Performance Measurements and Statistics of Tor Hidden Services
Loesing, K., Sandmann, W., Wilms, C., & Wirtz, G. (2008) · IEEE/IPSJ International Symposium on Applications and the Internet (SAINT) · doi:10.1109/saint.2008.69 · Cited by 36
Clayton, R., & Danezis, G. (2007) · Auerbach Publications eBooks · doi:10.1201/9781420052183-12 · Cited by 37
Adaptive Performance Anomaly Detection in Distributed Systems Using Online SVMs
Cid-Fuentes, J. Á., Szabo, C., & Falkner, K. E. K. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · doi:10.1109/tdsc.2018.2821693 · Cited by 38
“…(P2P) networks used for file sharing such as BitTorrent [6]; high performance computing (HPC) clusters; privacy oriented networks like TOR [7]; the internal networks of companies and universities; vast networks of small devices in the context of IoT; virtualized infrastructures on demand…”
Building trust in peer-to-peer systems: a review
Zhu, B., Jajodia, S., & Kankanhalli, M. (2006) · International Journal of Security and Networks · doi:10.1504/ijsn.2006.010827 · Cited by 39
Preserving Traffic Privacy in Wireless Mesh Networks
Wu, T., Xue, Y., & Cui, Y. (2006) · IEEE International Symposium on a World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM) · doi:10.1109/wowmom.2006.91 · Cited by 36
Formal and Computational Cryptography: Protocols, Hashes and Commitments
Garcia, F. D. (2008) · Radboud Repository (Radboud University) · Cited by 36
Report on the NSF Workshop on Formal Methods for SecurityPreprint
Chong, S., Guttman, J. D., Datta, A., Myers, A. C., Pierce, B. C., Schaumont, P. R., Sherwood, T., & Zeldovich, N. (2016) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1608.00678 · Cited by 49
“While there is some work on formal analysis of anonymous communication protocols and systems including Tor [102, 49], this is a rich area that awaits a deeper dive from our community.”
MethodSyverson, P. F. (2013) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-36213-2_25 · Cited by 41
Self-citationEfficient Private Information Retrieval Over Unsynchronized Databases
Fanti, G. C., & Ramchandran, K. (2015) · IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Signal Processing · doi:10.1109/jstsp.2015.2432740 · Cited by 38
“The most common class of solutions aims to hide the identity of the client, often through techniques like onion-routing; Tor is the most well-known network in this class [11].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Dingledine, R., Mathewson, N., & Syverson, P.
- Affiliations
- United States Naval Research Laboratory (US)
- Publisher
- Defense Technical Information Center
- Published
- 2004-01-01
- OpenAlex
- W1655958391
- Cited by
- 4,104
- References
- 46
- Citations by year
- 2026: 85 · 2025: 162 · 2024: 167 · 2023: 176 · 2022: 158 · 2021: 195 · 2020: 191 · 2019: 167 · 2018: 221 · 2017: 215 · 2016: 264 · 2015: 280 · 2014: 256 · 2013: 253 · 2012: 270
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Peer-to-Peer Network Technologies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Privacy, Security, and Data Protection
- Keywords
- Tor, onion routing, anonymous communication, forward secrecy, congestion control, directory servers, integrity verification, exit policy, rendezvous points, anonymity, network latency
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.