Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router
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Abstract
We present Tor, a circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication service. This Onion Routing system addresses limitations in the earlier design by adding perfect forward secrecy, congestion control, directory servers, integrity checking, configurable exit policies, anticensorship features, guard nodes, application- and user-selectable stream isolation, and a practical design for location-hidden services via rendezvous points. Tor is deployed on the real-world Internet, requires no special privileges or kernel modifications, requires little synchronization or coordination between nodes, and provides a reasonable tradeoff between anonymity, usability, and efficiency. An earlier paper in 2004 described Tor’s original design; here we explain Tor’s current design as of late 2012, and describe our experiences with an international network of approximately 3000 nodes and 500000 users. We close with a list of open problems in anonymous communication.
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“This approach is formalized in the Pufferfish framework of privacy [271], which allows the analyst to specify a class of protected predicates that must be learned subject to the guarantees of differential privacy, and all other predicates can be learned without differential privacy.”
From Advances and Open Problems in Federated Learning (2021) · cites this paper as [271]
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Gisdakis, S., Giannetsos, T., & Papadimitratos, P. (2016) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2016.2560768 · Cited by 125
Catena: Efficient Non-equivocation via Bitcoin
Tomescu, A., & Devadas, S. (2017) · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) · doi:10.1109/sp.2017.19 · Cited by 125
“Since Tor does not try to conceal who is connected to the network [12], we are not concerned about Catena’s header relay network learning who is using Tor.”
BackgroundMethodAttribute-Based Publishing with Hidden Credentials and Hidden Policies.
Kapadia, A. C., Tsang, P. P., & Smith, S. W. (2007) · Cited by 124
Improving wireless privacy with an identifier-free link layer protocol
Greenstein, B., McCoy, D., Pang, J., Kohno, T., Seshan, S., & Wetherall, D. (2008) · Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services · doi:10.1145/1378600.1378607 · Cited by 124
“We are not concerned with preventing the service from linking together the client’s packets (or vice versa), as techniques used to hide a client’s identity from a service in wired networks (e.g., [ 14 ]) are also applicable in wireless networks.”
MethodCatch Me If You Can: A Cloud-Enabled DDoS Defense
Jia, Q., Wang, H., Fleck, D., Li, F., Stavrou, A., & Powell, W. (2014) · International Conference on Dependable Systems & Networks/Proceedings · doi:10.1109/dsn.2014.35 · Cited by 123
Elmisery, A. M., Rho, S., & Botvich, D. (2016) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2016.2631546 · Cited by 123
“…concealment process was used to conceal user’s health data for different measurements in his/her profile and an anonymous data collection protocol is used to hide the user’s network identity by routing the communication with other participants through relaying nodes in Tor’s anonymous network [13].”
MethodStegoTorus: a camouflage proxy for the Tor anonymity system
Weinberg, Z., Wang, J., Yegneswaran, V., Briesemeister, L., Cheung, S., Wang, F., & Boneh, D. (2012) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/2382196.2382211 · Cited by 163
“No observer at any single point in the network, not even a malicious relay, can know both the source and the destination of Tor tra ffi c.”
BackgroundKeeping a Low Profile? Technology, Risk and Privacy among Undocumented Immigrants
Guberek, T., McDonald, A., Simioni, S., Mhaidli, A. H., Toyama, K., & Schaub, F. (2018) · CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3173574.3173688 · Cited by 135
“Options for alternate platforms or encrypted communication channels are limited; while security and privacy tools like anonymous browsing [35], decentralized social networking [34, 61], and encrypted communication tools [15, 107] are active research topics, these tools have not been widely adopted.”
TrafficSliver: Fighting Website Fingerprinting Attacks with Traffic Splitting
la Cadena, W. D., Mitseva, A., Hiller, J., Pennekamp, J., Reuter, S., Filter, J., Engel, T., Wehrle, K., & Panchenko, A. (2020) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/3372297.3423351 · Cited by 180
“, a malicious entry OR— one of the weakest adversaries in the attacker model of Tor [12] — Tor cannot conceal the number, direction, and timing of transmitted packets.”
BackgroundProtocol misidentification made easy with format-transforming encryption
Dyer, K. P., Coull, S. E., Ristenpart, T., & Shrimpton, T. (2013) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/2508859.2516657 · Cited by 144
The Economics of Personal Data and the Economics of Privacy
Acquisti, A. (2010) · KiltHub Repository · doi:10.1184/r1/6471989 · Cited by 127
ANDaNA: Anonymous Named Data Networking ApplicationPreprint
DiBenedetto, S., Gasti, P., Tsudik, G., & Uzun, E. (2011) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1112.2205 · Cited by 139
“However, exit policies similar to those in Tor [18] can be used with ANDaNA based on content names.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialThe Sniper Attack: Anonymously Deanonymizing and Disabling the Tor Network
Jansen, R., Tschorsch, F., Johnson, A., & Scheuermann, B. (2014) · Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2014.23288 · Cited by 119
Circuit fingerprinting attacks: passive deanonymization of tor hidden services
Kwon, A., AlSabah, M., Lazar, D., Daciér, M., & Devadas, S. (2015) · USENIX Security Symposium · Cited by 192
LASTor: A Low-Latency AS-Aware Tor Client
Akhoondi, M., Yu, C., & Madhyastha, H. V. (2012) · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) · doi:10.1109/sp.2012.35 · Cited by 118
Location Cheating: A Security Challenge to Location-Based Social Network Services
He, W., Liu, X., & Ren, M. (2011) · Proceedings of the ... International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems/Proceedings of the International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems · doi:10.1109/icdcs.2011.42 · Cited by 117
“Although tools like Tor [ 20 ] may provide a high level of anonymity on the Internet, it also suffers from limited performance for crawling purpose.”
MethodPrivacy in content-oriented networking: threats and countermeasures
Chaabane, A., Cristofaro, E. D., Kâafar, M. A., & Uzun, E. (2013) · ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review · doi:10.1145/2500098.2500102 · Cited by 118
“Tor [25] is the best-known, and most widely used, low-latency anonymizing tool.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Dingledine, R., Mathewson, N., & Syverson, P.
- Affiliations
- United States Naval Research Laboratory (US)
- Publisher
- Defense Technical Information Center
- Published
- 2004-01-01
- OpenAlex
- W1655958391
- Cited by
- 4,104
- References
- 46
- Citations by year
- 2026: 85 · 2025: 162 · 2024: 167 · 2023: 176 · 2022: 158 · 2021: 195 · 2020: 191 · 2019: 167 · 2018: 221 · 2017: 215 · 2016: 264 · 2015: 280 · 2014: 256 · 2013: 253 · 2012: 270
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Peer-to-Peer Network Technologies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Privacy, Security, and Data Protection
- Keywords
- Tor, onion routing, anonymous communication, forward secrecy, congestion control, directory servers, integrity verification, exit policy, rendezvous points, anonymity, network latency
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.