Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 46 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We present Tor, a circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication service. This Onion Routing system addresses limitations in the earlier design by adding perfect forward secrecy, congestion control, directory servers, integrity checking, configurable exit policies, anticensorship features, guard nodes, application- and user-selectable stream isolation, and a practical design for location-hidden services via rendezvous points. Tor is deployed on the real-world Internet, requires no special privileges or kernel modifications, requires little synchronization or coordination between nodes, and provides a reasonable tradeoff between anonymity, usability, and efficiency. An earlier paper in 2004 described Tor’s original design; here we explain Tor’s current design as of late 2012, and describe our experiences with an international network of approximately 3000 nodes and 500000 users. We close with a list of open problems in anonymous communication.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“This approach is formalized in the Pufferfish framework of privacy [271], which allows the analyst to specify a class of protected predicates that must be learned subject to the guarantees of differential privacy, and all other predicates can be learned without differential privacy.”
From Advances and Open Problems in Federated Learning (2021) · cites this paper as [271]
Citations
Cites
Douceur, J. R. (2002) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-45748-8_24 · Cited by 4,419 · cited 2×
“Many of the open problems in low-latency anonymity networks, such as generating dummy traffic or preventing Sybil attacks [22], may be solvable independently from the issues solved by Tor.”
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Chaum, D. L. (1981) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/358549.358563 · Cited by 4,289
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
Reiter, M. K., & Rubin, A. D. (1998) · ACM Transactions on Information and System Security · doi:10.1145/290163.290168 · Cited by 1,770 · cited 5×
“While Tarzan and MorphMix use layered encryption as above, Crowds [42] simply assumes an adversary who cannot observe the initiator: it uses no public-key encryption, so any node on a circuit can read users’ traffic.”
InfluentialDierks, T., & Allen, C. (1999) · doi:10.17487/rfc2246 · Cited by 1,654 · cited 14×
“The identity key is used to sign TLS certificates, to sign the OR’s router descriptor (a summary of its keys, address, bandwidth, exit policy, and so on), and (by directory servers) to sign directories.”
InfluentialWide-area cooperative storage with CFS
Dabek, F., Kaashoek, M. F., Karger, D., Morris, R., & Stoica, I. (2001) · Proceedings of the eighteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles · doi:10.1145/502034.502054 · Cited by 1,428
Anonymous connections and onion routing
Reed, M. G., Syverson, P. F., & Goldschlag, D. M. (1998) · IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications · doi:10.1109/49.668972 · Cited by 1,063
Self-citationTarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Freedman, M. J., & Morris, R. (2002) · Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/586110.586137 · Cited by 663 · cited 3×
“They may intercept IP packets directly, and relay them whole (stripping the source address) along the circuit [8, 24].”
Mixminion: design of a type III anonymous remailer protocol
Danezis, G., Dingledine, R., & Mathewson, N. (2004) · Proceedings 19th International Conference on Data Engineering (Cat. No.03CH37405) · doi:10.1109/secpri.2003.1199323 · Cited by 658 · cited 2×
“All of these approaches limit exposure even when some selected users collude in the DoS.”
Self-citationGoldschlag, D. M., Reed, M. G., & Syverson, P. F. (1996) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-61996-8_37 · Cited by 494 · cited 3×
“No mixing, padding, or traffic shaping (yet): Onion Routing originally called for batching and reordering cells as they arrived, assumed padding between ORs, and in later designs added padding between onion proxies (users) and ORs [27, 41].”
Self-citationThe NRL Protocol Analyzer: An Overview
Meadows, C. (1996) · The Journal of Logic Programming · doi:10.1016/0743-1066(95)00095-x · Cited by 459
Cited by
Items 201–300 of 1,001
Decoy Routing: Toward Unblockable Internet Communication
Karlin, J., Ellard, D., Jackson, A. W., Jones, C. E., Lauer, G., Mankins, D. P., & Strayer, W. T. (2011) · Foundations of Computational Intelligence · Cited by 116
Anonymity Services Tor, I2P, JonDonym: Classifying in the Dark (Web)
Montieri, A., Ciuonzo, D., Aceto, G., & Pescapè, A. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · doi:10.1109/tdsc.2018.2804394 · Cited by 137
Toward a Comprehensive Insight Into the Eclipse Attacks of Tor Hidden Services
Tan, Q., Gao, Y., Shi, J., Wang, X., Fang, B., & Tian, Z. (2018) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2018.2846624 · Cited by 116
Location diversity in anonymity networks
Feamster, N., & Dingledine, R. (2004) · ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES) · doi:10.1145/1029179.1029199 · Cited by 116
Self-citationHCPP: Cryptography Based Secure EHR System for Patient Privacy and Emergency Healthcare
Sun, J., Zhu, X., Zhang, C., & Fang, Y. (2011) · 2011 31st International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems · doi:10.1109/icdcs.2011.83 · Cited by 114
Advances in cryptographic voting systems
Rivest, R. L., & Adida, B. (2006) · Cited by 114
Quantum Anonymous Transmissions
Christandl, M., & Wehner, S. (2005) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/11593447_12 · Cited by 132
Reputation Systems for Anonymous Networks
Androulaki, E., Choi, S. G., Bellovin, S. M., & Malkin, T. (2008) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-70630-4_13 · Cited by 133
Cachet: a decentralized architecture for privacy preserving social networking with caching
Nilizadeh, S., Jahid, S., Mittal, P., Borisov, N., & Kapadia, A. C. (2012) · ACM International Conference on emerging Networking EXperiments and Technologies (CoNEXT) · doi:10.1145/2413176.2413215 · Cited by 140
“To prevent the directory service from inferring user relationships, users can either (a) use anonymous communication channels such as Tor [23] to query the server, or (b) leverage private informa tion retrieval protocols [16] to hide the user name mapping that is being retrieved from the server.”
MethodRyoan: A Distributed Sandbox for Untrusted Computation on Secret Data
Hunt, T., Zhu, Z., Xu, Y., Peter, S., & Witchel, E. (2017) · ACM Transactions on Computer Systems · doi:10.1145/3231594 · Cited by 121
Analyzing the Great Firewall of China Over Space and Time
Ensafi, R., Winter, P., Mueen, A., & Crandall, J. R. (2015) · Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies · doi:10.1515/popets-2015-0005 · Cited by 113
Systematically Understanding the Cyber Attack Business: A Survey
Huang, K., Siegel, M., & Madnick, S. (2019) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3199674 · Cited by 112
Revisiting the Computational Practicality of Private Information Retrieval
Olumofin, F., & Goldberg, I. (2012) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-27576-0_13 · Cited by 132
“Further, other privacyenhancing technologies, such as anonymous remailers [9] and Tor [11], also make the assumption that not all of the servers involved are colluding against the user.”
BackgroundPalen, L. A., Anderson, K. M., Mark, G. J., Martin, J., Sicker, D., Palmer, M. S., & Grunwald, D. C. (2010) · Electronic workshops in computing · doi:10.14236/ewic/vocs2010.8 · Cited by 179
“describes many techniques to effectively remove these network identifiers and achieve a degree of anonymity (Chaum, 1988; Reiter & Rubin, 1998; Dingledine et al., 2004).”
BackgroundPost-Quantum Era Privacy Protection for Intelligent Infrastructures
Malina, L., Dzurenda, P., Ricci, S., Hajny, J., Srivastava, G., Matulevicius, R., Affia, A.-A. O., Laurent, M., Sultan, N. H., & Tang, Q. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3062201 · Cited by 111
“ToR [118] is based on a circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication service and onion routing.”
BackgroundMethodPreserving Location Privacy in Geosocial Applications
Puttaswamy, K. P. N., Wang, S., Steinbauer, T., Agrawal, D., Abbadi, A. E., Kruegel, C., & Zhao, B. Y. (2012) · IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing · doi:10.1109/tmc.2012.247 · Cited by 111
VeriFi: Towards Verifiable Federated Unlearning
Gao, X., Ma, X., Wang, J., Sun, Y., Li, B., Ji, S., Cheng, P., & Chen, J. (2024) · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · doi:10.1109/tdsc.2024.3382321 · Cited by 163
“Note that, the leaver protects its true identity, us-ing pseudonyms [32] or Tor [33], from being exposed to the central server during the checking process (Step 5.a), which would potentially mitigate the deceptive actions launched by the server.”
Mislove, A. E., Oberoi, G., Post, A., Reis, C., Druschel, P., & Wallach, D. S. (2004) · ACM SIGOPS European Workshop · doi:10.1145/1133572.1133578 · Cited by 111
A moving target DDoS defense mechanism
Wang, H., Jia, Q., Fleck, D., Powell, W., Li, F., & Stavrou, A. (2014) · Computer Communications · doi:10.1016/j.comcom.2014.03.009 · Cited by 110
“The goal of overlay networks, such as TOR [25], is to hide the protected nodes behind a well-provisioned, distributed overlay network that is capable of absorbing DDoS traffic.”
BackgroundCybercriminal Minds: An investigative study of cryptocurrency abuses in the Dark Web
Lee, S., Yoon, C., Kang, H., Kim, Y., Kim, Y., Han, D., Son, S., & Shin, S. (2019) · Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2019.23055 · Cited by 140
User centricity: a taxonomy and open issues
Abhilasha Bhargav-spantzel, A., Camenisch, J. L., Groß, T., & Sommer, D. (2006) · doi:10.1145/1179529.1179531 · Cited by 112
Participant Privacy in Mobile Crowd Sensing Task Management: A Survey of Methods and Challenges
Pournajaf, L., Garcia-Ulloa, D. A., Xiong, L., & Sunderam, V. S. (2016) · ACM SIGMOD Record · doi:10.1145/2935694.2935700 · Cited by 124
User-Defined Privacy Grid System for Continuous Location-Based Services
Schlegel, R., Chow, C.-Y., Huang, Q., & Wong, D. S. (2015) · IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing · doi:10.1109/tmc.2015.2388488 · Cited by 108
VPriv: protecting privacy in location-based vehicular services
Popa, R. A., Balakrishnan, H., & Blumberg, A. J. (2009) · USENIX Security Symposium · Cited by 134
HTTPS traffic analysis and client identification using passive SSL/TLS fingerprinting
Husák, M., Čermák, M., Jirsík, T., & Čeleda, P. (2016) · EURASIP Journal on Information Security · doi:10.1186/s13635-016-0030-7 · Cited by 107
PrETP: privacy-preserving electronic toll pricing
Balasch, J., Rial, A., Troncoso, C., Preneel, B., Verbauwhede, I. M. R., & Geuens, C. (2010) · Cited by 106
Solidus: Confidential Distributed Ledger Transactions via PVORM
Cecchetti, E., Zhang, F., Ji, Y., Kosba, A. E., Juels, A., & Shi, E. (2017) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/3133956.3134010 · Cited by 112
Riposte: An Anonymous Messaging System Handling Millions of Users
Corrigan-Gibbs, H., Boneh, D., & Mazières, D. (2015) · Cited by 106
Surviving attacks on disruption-tolerant networks without authentication
Burgess, J., Bissias, G. D., Corner, M. D., & Levine, B. N. (2007) · ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc) · doi:10.1145/1288107.1288116 · Cited by 106
“ing BitTorrent, SETI@home, and Tor [10].”
InfluentialStadium: A Distributed Metadata-Private Messaging System
Tyagi, N., Gilad, Y., Leung, D., Zaharia, M., & Zeldovich, N. (2017) · ACM SIGOPS Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP) · doi:10.1145/3132747.3132783 · Cited by 158
Multi-Agent Systems and Blockchain: Results from a Systematic Literature Review
Calvaresi, D., Dubovitskaya, A., Calbimonte, J.-P., Taveter, K., & Schumacher, M. (2018) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-94580-4_9 · Cited by 126
Defeating Vanish with Low-Cost Sybil Attacks Against Large DHTs
Wolchoky, S., Hofmanny, O. S., Heninger, N., Felten, E. W., Halderman, J. A., Rossbach, C. J., Waters, B. R., & Witchel, E. (2010) · Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · Cited by 103
Muir, J. A., & van Oorschot, P. C. (2009) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/1592451.1592455 · Cited by 103
Seeing through Network-Protocol Obfuscation
Wang, L., Dyer, K. P., Akella, A., Ristenpart, T., & Shrimpton, T. (2015) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/2810103.2813715 · Cited by 130
“Tor [11], an onion routing system, helps circumvent IP-based filtering due to its use of a large number of proxies (and bridges).”
BackgroundStealthy traffic analysis of low-latency anonymous communication using throughput fingerprinting
Mittal, P., Khurshid, A., Juen, J. P., Caesar, M., & Borisov, N. (2011) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/2046707.2046732 · Cited by 101
“Traditional security analyses of Tor [16] assume that a user who controls (or observes) a fraction f of the network can compromise the anonymity of f 2 of all tunnels by end-to-end timing analysis (by observing the entry and exit point of a stream).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialCashmere: resilient anonymous routing
Li, Z., Zhou, F., Zhao, B. Y., & Rowstron, A. I. T. (2005) · doi:10.5555/1251203.1251225 · Cited by 101
A new cell counter based attack against tor
Ling, Z., Luo, J., Yu, W., Fu, X., Dong, X., & Weijia Jia, B. (2009) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/1653662.1653732 · Cited by 102
HORNET: High-speed Onion Routing at the Network Layer
Chen, C., Asoni, D. E., Barrera, D., Danezis, G., & Perrig, A. (2015) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/2810103.2813628 · Cited by 141
“While these systems are generally intended as overlays, some proposals [14, 15] are closer to the network layer in that they use UDP (instead of TCP [23]) between pairs of onion routers.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialCAP: A Context-Aware Privacy Protection System for Location-Based Services
Pingley, A., Yu, W., Zhang, N., Fu, X., & Zhao, W. (2009) · IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS) · doi:10.1109/icdcs.2009.62 · Cited by 100
“To address this problem, we use Tor [4], [ 5 ], a popular anonymous routing network, to hide a user’s IP address.”
MethodBarratt, M. J., Lenton, S. R., Maddox, A., & Allen, M. (2016) · International Journal of Drug Policy · doi:10.1016/j.drugpo.2016.04.006 · Cited by 100
Framing dependencies introduced by underground commoditization
Thomas, K., Huang, D. Y., Wang, D. Y., Bursztein, E., Grier, C., Holt, T., Kruegel, C., McCoy, D., Savage, S., & Vigna, G. (2015) · Workshop on the Economics of Information Security · Cited by 124
Match Me if You Can: Matchmaking Encryption and Its Applications
Ateniese, G., Francati, D., Núñez, D., & Venturi, D. (2019) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-26951-7_24 · Cited by 105
De-Anonymisation Attacks on Tor: A Survey
Karunanayake, I., Ahmed, N., Malaney, R., Islam, R., & Jha, S. K. (2021) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2021.3093615 · Cited by 131
“These changes helped to address some security issues that were in the original design.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSurvey on anonymous communications in computer networks
Ren, J., & Wu, J. (2009) · Computer Communications · doi:10.1016/j.comcom.2009.11.009 · Cited by 112
The Cracked Cookie Jar: HTTP Cookie Hijacking and the Exposure of Private Information
Sivakorn, S., Polakis, I., & Keromytis, A. D. (2016) · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) · doi:10.1109/sp.2016.49 · Cited by 102
Towards a value theory for personal data
Spiekermann, S., & Korunovska, J. (2017) · Journal of Information Technology · doi:10.1057/jit.2016.4 · Cited by 99
“Also data management tools are becoming available to users, both to conceal the information users exchange (Dingledine et al. , 2004; Camenisch et al. , 2005; Hansen et al. , 2008) and to determine conditions of use based on policies (Casassa Mont et al. , 2003; Nguyen et al. , 2013).”
BackgroundA Survey on Blockchain Scalability: From Hardware to Layer-Two Protocols
Rebello, G. A. F., Camilo, G. F., de Souza, L. A. C., Potop-Butucaru, M., de Amorim, M. D., Campista, M. E. M., & Costa, L. H. M. K. (2024) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2024.3376252 · Cited by 130
“Payments use onion routing [208], a transport protocol that encrypts packets at every hop, mostly known for its Tor network implementation.”
An improved clock-skew measurement technique for revealing hidden services
Zander, S., & Murdoch, S. J. (2008) · Swinburne figshare (Swinburne University of Technology) · Cited by 99
I want my voice to be heard: IP over Voice-over-IP for unobservable censorship circumvention.
Houmansadr, A., Riedl, T., Borisov, N., & Singer, A. C. (2013) · Cited by 98
Deanonymizing Tor hidden service users through Bitcoin transactions analysis
Jawaheri, H. A., Sabah, M. A., Boshmaf, Y., & Erbad, A. (2019) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2019.101684 · Cited by 122
“Tor [14] is the most widely used anonymous communication network available online.”
BackgroundDigging into Anonymous Traffic: A Deep Analysis of the Tor Anonymizing Network
Chaabane, A., Manils, P., & Kâafar, M. A. (2010) · International Conference on Network and System Security (NSS) · doi:10.1109/nss.2010.47 · Cited by 98
Can't You Hear Me Knocking: Identification of User Actions on Android Apps via Traffic Analysis
Conti, M., Mancini, L. V., Spolaor, R., & Verde, N. V. (2015) · ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy (CODASPY) · doi:10.1145/2699026.2699119 · Cited by 125
Kate, A., Zaverucha, G., & Goldberg, I. (2007) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-75551-7_7 · Cited by 98
Vogt, R., Aycock, J., & Jacobson, M. J. (2007) · Cited by 97
A Survey on Mix Networks and Their Secure Applications
Sampigethaya, K., & Poovendran, R. (2006) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2006.889687 · Cited by 124
SGX-LKL: Securing the Host OS Interface for Trusted ExecutionPreprint
Priebe, C., Muthukumaran, D., Lind, J., Zhu, H., Cui, S., Sartakov, V. A., & Pietzuch, P. R. (2019) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1908.11143 · Cited by 132
“e approaches do not offer a file system abstraction with POSIX semantics. Unobservable communication. For message systems, hiding which users communicate is challenging. Anonymous networks such as Tor [32] are susceptible to traffic analysis attacks [46,72]. Dining Cryptographers (DC) networks [19,91,113] provide strong…”
BackgroundAn improved algorithm for tor circuit scheduling
Tang, C., & Goldberg, I. (2010) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/1866307.1866345 · Cited by 95
High Precision Open-World Website Fingerprinting
Wang, T. (2020) · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) · doi:10.1109/sp40000.2020.00015 · Cited by 120
Chipping away at censorship firewalls with user-generated content
Burnett, S., Feamster, N., & Vempala, S. (2010) · Cited by 94
Insights from the inside: a view of botnet management from infiltration
Cho, C. Y., Caballero, J., Grier, C., Paxson, V., & Song, D. X. (2010) · Cited by 94
Achieving Efficient Query Privacy for Location Based Services
Olumofin, F., Tysowski, P. K., Goldberg, I., & Hengartner, U. (2010) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-14527-8_6 · Cited by 105
“In the case where a mobile user utilizes Wi-Fi instead, the user will be assigned an address that points to the nearby access point, however, and may need to employ other techniques, such as Tor, to mask the address.”
BackgroundPerformance and Security Improvements for Tor
AlSabah, M., & Goldberg, I. (2016) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/2946802 · Cited by 94
“Tor [Dingledine et al. 2004] is the most widely used anonymity network today, serving millions of users on a”
BackgroundAssessing market competition and vendors’ size and scope on AlphaBay
Paquet-Clouston, M., Décary-Hêtu, D., & Morselli, C. (2018) · International Journal of Drug Policy · doi:10.1016/j.drugpo.2018.01.003 · Cited by 104
Deng, X., Zhu, J., Pei, X., Zhang, L., Ling, Z., & Xue, K. (2022) · IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management · doi:10.1109/tnsm.2022.3213807 · Cited by 111
“Tor [40] is one of the most popular privacy-enhancing tools.”
BackgroundEfficient Private Statistics with Succinct Sketches
Melis, L., Danezis, G., & De Cristofaro, E. (2016) · Proceedings 2016 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2016.23175 · Cited by 84
A Case Study on Measuring Statistical Data in the Tor Anonymity Network
Loesing, K., Murdoch, S. J., & Dingledine, R. (2010) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-14992-4_19 · Cited by 94
Self-citationSuperNova: Super-peers based architecture for decentralized online social networks
Sharma, R. R., & Datta, A. (2012) · International Conference on Communication Systems & Networks (COMSNETS) · doi:10.1109/comsnets.2012.6151349 · Cited by 93
On preserving privacy in content-oriented networks
Arianfar, S., Koponen, T., Raghavan, B., & Shenker, S. J. (2011) · ACM Conference on Information-Centric Networking (ICN) · doi:10.1145/2018584.2018589 · Cited by 101
Evolution of Dark Web Threat Analysis and Detection: A Systematic Approach
Nazah, S., Huda, S., Abawajy, J., & Hassan, M. M. (2020) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2020.3024198 · Cited by 92
“[51], [110].”
Elmisery, A. M., Rho, S., & Aborizka, M. A. (2017) · Cluster Computing · doi:10.1007/s10586-017-1298-1 · Cited by 99
The use of TLS in Censorship Circumvention
Frolov, S., & Wustrow, E. (2019) · Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2019.23511 · Cited by 117
“meek is a domain fronting-based pluggable transport used by Tor to circumvent censorship [14], [16], [17]. meek tunnels through the Firefox ESR (Extended Support Release) version that is bundled with the Tor Browser.”
MethodImproving tor using a TCP-over-DTLS tunnel
Reardon, J., & Goldberg, I. (2009) · UWSpace (University of Waterloo) · Cited by 92
ShadowWalker: peer-to-peer anonymous communication using redundant structured topologies
Mittal, P., & Borisov, N. (2009) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/1653662.1653683 · Cited by 93
LAP: Lightweight Anonymity and Privacy
Hsiao, H., Kim, T. H., Perrig, A., Yamada, A., Nelson, S. C., Gruteser, M., & Meng, W. (2012) · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) · doi:10.1109/sp.2012.37 · Cited by 90
OONI : Open Observatory of Network Interference
Filastò, A., & Appelbaum, J. (2012) · TU/e Research Portal · Cited by 90
Winter, P., Pulls, T., & Fuß, J. (2013) · ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES) · doi:10.1145/2517840.2517856 · Cited by 89
Security and privacy protection technologies in securing blockchain applications
Wen, B., Wang, Y., Ding, Y., Zheng, H., Qin, B., & Yang, C. (2023) · Information Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.ins.2023.119322 · Cited by 97
SWIRL: A Scalable Watermark to Detect Correlated Network Flows.
Houmansadr, A., & Borisov, N. (2011) · Cited by 89
A Survey on Routing in Anonymous Communication Protocols
Shirazi, F., Simeonovski, M., Asghar, M. R., Michael Backes, A., & Díaz, C. (2018) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3182658 · Cited by 89
Behavior-based tracking: Exploiting characteristic patterns in DNS traffic
Herrmann, D., Banse, C., & Federrath, H. (2013) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2013.03.012 · Cited by 109
Nymble: Blocking Misbehaving Users in Anonymizing Networks
Tsang, P. P., Kapadia, A. C., Cornelius, C. T., & Smith, S. W. (2009) · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · doi:10.1109/tdsc.2009.38 · Cited by 90
“The Abuse FAQ for Tor Server Operators lists several such examples at http://tor.eff.org/faq-abuse.html.en. complaining to a group manager.”
BackgroundInfluentialSystematizing Decentralization and Privacy: Lessons from 15 Years of Research and Deployments
Troncoso, C., Isaakidis, M., Danezis, G., & Halpin, H. (2017) · Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies · doi:10.1515/popets-2017-0056 · Cited by 124
“…against decentralized systems: the predecessor attack [174, 175] uncovers communication partners in many anonymous communication schemes [37, 57, 129, 150], or the Sybil attack which can be used to bias reputation scores [59] or corrupt the information exchanged in collaborative…”
BackgroundTwo-factor authentication: is the world ready?
Petsas, T., Tsirantonakis, G., Athanasopoulos, E., & Ioannidis, S. (2015) · European Workshop on System Security · doi:10.1145/2751323.2751327 · Cited by 114
Measuring and Analyzing Search-Redirection Attacks in the Illicit Online Prescription Drug Trade
Leontiadis, N. (2011) · Cited by 119
Solutions to Security and Privacy Issues in Mobile Social Networking
Beach, A., Gartrell, M., & Han, R. Y. (2009) · doi:10.1109/cse.2009.243 · Cited by 87
Use Fewer Instances of the Letter “i”: Toward Writing Style Anonymization
McDonald, A., Afroz, S., Caliskan, A., Stolerman, A., & Greenstadt, R. (2012) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-31680-7_16 · Cited by 90
“Anonymity at the network level can be achieved through onion routing systems like Tor [9].”
BackgroundXRay: Enhancing the Web's Transparency with Differential Correlation
Lécuyer, M., Ducoffe, G., Lan, F., Papancea, A., Petsios, T., Spahn, R., Chaintreau, A., & Geambasu, R. (2014) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1407.2323 · Cited by 69
Li, S., Schliep, M., & Hopper, N. (2014) · Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society · doi:10.1145/2665943.2665944 · Cited by 86
“Also StegoTorus generates incorrect PDF lacking the xref table .”
InfluentialOpenSGX: An Open Platform for SGX Research
Jain, P., Desai, S., Kim, S., Shih, M.-W., Lee, J., Choi, C., Shin, Y., Kim, T., Byunghoon Kang, B., & Han, D. (2016) · Proceedings 2016 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2016.23011 · Cited by 82
Sustainable blockchain through proof of exercise
Shoker, A. (2017) · 2017 IEEE 16th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications (NCA) · doi:10.1109/nca.2017.8171383 · Cited by 85
“Shuffling can be done via a shuffling service that can be implemented as an onion routing [21] service on Bitcoin’s network peers themselves, or using an external service like TOR [16].”
BackgroundUnderstanding Tor Usage with Privacy-Preserving Measurement
Mani, A., Wilson-Brown, T., Jansen, R., Johnson, A., & Sherr, M. (2018) · ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC) · doi:10.1145/3278532.3278549 · Cited by 111
What's going on? learning communication rules in edge networks
Kandula, S., Chandra, R., & Katabi, D. (2008) · ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review · doi:10.1145/1402946.1402970 · Cited by 84
Privacy and emergency response in e-healthcare leveraging wireless body sensor networks
Sun, J., Fang, Y. M., & Zhu, X. (2010) · IEEE Wireless Communications · doi:10.1109/mwc.2010.5416352 · Cited by 85
The Velocity of Censorship: High-Fidelity Detection of Microblog Post DeletionsPreprint
Zhu, T., Phipps, D., Pridgen, A., Crandall, J. R., & Wallach, D. S. (2013) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1303.0597 · Cited by 85
Riffle: An Efficient Communication System With Strong Anonymity
Kwon, A., Lazar, D., Devadas, S., & Ford, B. (2016) · Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies · doi:10.1515/popets-2016-0008 · Cited by 84
“The right to remain anonymous is a fundamental right in a democratic society and is crucial for freedom of speech [49].”
Elahi, T., Bauer, K. S., AlSabah, M., Dingledine, R., & Goldberg, I. (2012) · ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES) · doi:10.1145/2381966.2381973 · Cited by 84
Self-citationEnabling Confidentiality in Content-Based Publish/Subscribe Infrastructures
Raiciu, C., & Rosenblum, D. S. (2006) · International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks (SecureComm) · doi:10.1109/seccomw.2006.359552 · Cited by 98
Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms for Crowdsensing: Survey and Research Challenges
Vergara-Laurens, I. J., Jaimes, L. G., & Labrador, M. A. (2016) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2016.2594205 · Cited by 83
“[44] proposes to use anonymizing networks, such as Tor [19].”
MethodA Survey of Timing Channels and Countermeasures
Biswas, A. K., Ghosal, D., & Nagaraja, S. (2017) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3023872 · Cited by 83
“NFW can also be used to de-anonymize an anonymous network [Dingledine et al. 2004].”
BackgroundA Combinatorial Approach to Measuring Anonymity
Edman, M., Sivrikaya, F., & Yener, B. (2007) · IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI) · doi:10.1109/isi.2007.379497 · Cited by 85
Metadata
- Authors
- Dingledine, R., Mathewson, N., & Syverson, P.
- Affiliations
- United States Naval Research Laboratory (US)
- Publisher
- Defense Technical Information Center
- Published
- 2004-01-01
- OpenAlex
- W1655958391
- Cited by
- 4,104
- References
- 46
- Citations by year
- 2026: 85 · 2025: 162 · 2024: 167 · 2023: 176 · 2022: 158 · 2021: 195 · 2020: 191 · 2019: 167 · 2018: 221 · 2017: 215 · 2016: 264 · 2015: 280 · 2014: 256 · 2013: 253 · 2012: 270
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Peer-to-Peer Network Technologies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Privacy, Security, and Data Protection
- Keywords
- Tor, onion routing, anonymous communication, forward secrecy, congestion control, directory servers, integrity verification, exit policy, rendezvous points, anonymity, network latency
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.