Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router
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Abstract
We present Tor, a circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication service. This Onion Routing system addresses limitations in the earlier design by adding perfect forward secrecy, congestion control, directory servers, integrity checking, configurable exit policies, anticensorship features, guard nodes, application- and user-selectable stream isolation, and a practical design for location-hidden services via rendezvous points. Tor is deployed on the real-world Internet, requires no special privileges or kernel modifications, requires little synchronization or coordination between nodes, and provides a reasonable tradeoff between anonymity, usability, and efficiency. An earlier paper in 2004 described Tor’s original design; here we explain Tor’s current design as of late 2012, and describe our experiences with an international network of approximately 3000 nodes and 500000 users. We close with a list of open problems in anonymous communication.
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“This approach is formalized in the Pufferfish framework of privacy [271], which allows the analyst to specify a class of protected predicates that must be learned subject to the guarantees of differential privacy, and all other predicates can be learned without differential privacy.”
From Advances and Open Problems in Federated Learning (2021) · cites this paper as [271]
Citations
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BackgroundA Formal Model of Obfuscation and Negotiation for Location Privacy
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Improved website fingerprinting on Tor
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“Tor is a popular privacy enhancing system that is designed to protect the privacy of Internet users from traffic analysis attacks launched by a non-global adversary [1].”
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“Such services include anonymizing proxies [8], and dark nets [5].”
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Backgroundk-fingerprinting: a Robust Scalable Website Fingerprinting TechniquePreprint
Hayes, J., & Danezis, G. (2015) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1509.00789 · Cited by 488
Amplification by Shuffling: From Local to Central Differential Privacy via Anonymity
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BackgroundMethodPrivacy and Data Protection by Design - from policy to engineering
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BackgroundA Survey on Anonymity and Privacy in Bitcoin-Like Digital Cash Systems
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“There are also approaches like anonymous communication using Onion Routing like Tor (Dingledine et al., 2004), which are very important in health services sectors.”
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LDP-FL: Practical Private Aggregation in Federated Learning with Local Differential Privacy
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“Due to increases in mass surveillance and other attacks on privacy, many Internet users have turned to Tor [11] to protect their anonymity.”
BackgroundOn the Feasibility of Internet-Scale Author Identification
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Countermeasures Against Traffic Analysis Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks
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“Tor [6] is the second-generation onion router, which is a circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication service on the Internet.”
BackgroundA Survey of Solutions to the Sybil Attack
Levine, B. N., Shields, C., & Margolin, N. B. (2006) · Cited by 288
Spying on the Smart Home: Privacy Attacks and Defenses on Encrypted IoT Traffic
Apthorpe, N., Reisman, D., Sundaresan, S., Narayanan, A., & Feamster, N. (2017) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1708.05044 · Cited by 173
“We believe that such “mixes” for smart homes could work in a similar fashion as anonymity mixes in other contexts [11, 14].”
BackgroundLost on the Silk Road: Online drug distribution and the ‘cryptomarket’
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“Side channels in the form of timing analysis [10] and power analysis [18] have been extensively studied in literature.”
BackgroundUsers get routed: traffic correlation on tor by realistic adversaries
Johnson, A., Wacek, C., Jansen, R., Sherr, M., & Syverson, P. (2013) · Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security - CCS '13 · doi:10.1145/2508859.2516651 · Cited by 233
“Tor is a volunteer-operated anonymity network that is estimated to protect the privacy of hundreds of thousands of daily users [13, 22].”
BackgroundSelf-citationPerspectives: Improving SSH-style Host Authentication with Multi-Path Probing
Wendlandt, D., Andersen, D. G., & Perrig, A. (2018) · doi:10.1184/r1/6608366 · Cited by 236
Trawling for Tor Hidden Services: Detection, Measurement, Deanonymization
Biryukov, A., Pustogarov, I., & Weinmann, R. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2013.15 · Cited by 236
“Keywords-Tor; anonymity network; privacy; hidden services I. INTRODUCTION Research into low-latency anonymity networks has mostly focused on sender anonymity, i.e. allowing users to connect to network resources without disclosing their network address to the destination.”
Tracking anonymous peer-to-peer VoIP calls on the internet
Wang, X., Chen, S., & Jajodia, S. (2005) · Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1102120.1102133 · Cited by 228
Compromising electromagnetic emanations of wired and wireless keyboards
Vuagnoux, M., & Pasini, S. (2009) · Cited by 224
Authorship Attribution for Social Media Forensics
Rocha, A., Scheirer, W. J., Forstall, C. W., Cavalcante, T., Theophilo, A., Shen, B., Carvalho, A. R. B., & Stamatatos, E. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · doi:10.1109/tifs.2016.2603960 · Cited by 222
Network Flow Watermarking Attack on Low-Latency Anonymous Communication Systems
Wang, X., Chen, S., & Jajodia, S. (2007) · 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07) · doi:10.1109/sp.2007.30 · Cited by 219
“com [1], Crowds [25], Onion Routing [24], Tor [9], Hordes [27], Web Mixes [3]) have been designed to provide anonymity to the communicating parties.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialIPFS and Friends: A Qualitative Comparison of Next Generation Peer-to-Peer Data Networks
Daniel, E., & Tschorsch, F. (2022) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2022.3143147 · Cited by 214
Spot Me if You Can: Uncovering Spoken Phrases in Encrypted VoIP Conversations
Wright, C. V., Ballard, L., Coull, S. E., Monrose, F., & Masson, G. M. (2008) · 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (sp 2008) · doi:10.1109/sp.2008.21 · Cited by 212
“[39] proposed a method of tracking VoIP calls across anonymizing networks, like ToR [6], through the use of packet timing as a watermark.”
MethodVuvuzela: scalable private messaging resistant to traffic analysis
van den Hooff, J., Lazar, D., Zaharia, M., & Zeldovich, N. (2015) · Proceedings of the 25th Symposium on Operating Systems Principles · doi:10.1145/2815400.2815417 · Cited by 216
“On the other hand, scalable systems like Tor [16] and mixnets [9] provide little protection against powerful adversaries that can observe and tamper with network tra ffi c.”
Quantum Resource Estimates for Computing Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithms
Roetteler, M., Naehrig, M., Svore, K. M., & Lauter, K. (2017) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-70697-9_9 · Cited by 212
Armknecht, F., Karame, G. O., Mandal, A., Youssef, F., & Zenner, E. (2015) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-22846-4_10 · Cited by 204
Power/freedom on the dark web: A digital ethnography of the Dark Web Social Network
Gehl, R. W. (2016) · New Media & Society · doi:10.1177/1461444814554900 · Cited by 177
“Moreover, those who run dark websites that end in .onion are able to hide their identities and locations from most, if not all, Internet users (Dingledine et al., 2004).”
BackgroundA Privacy Model for Smart Metering
Bohli, J.-M., Sorge, C., & Ugus, O. (2010) · 2010 IEEE International Conference on Communications Workshops · doi:10.1109/iccw.2010.5503916 · Cited by 203
“In the field of telecommunications, the most relevant related work is on anonymization techniques, such as onion routing (which is, for example, implemented in TOR [ 7 ]) and Crowds [8].”
BackgroundBlindcoin: Blinded, Accountable Mixes for Bitcoin
Valenta, L., & Rowan, B. (2015) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48051-9_9 · Cited by 205
Detecting Environment-Sensitive Malware
Lindorfer, M., Kolbitsch, C., & Milani Comparetti, P. (2011) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-23644-0_18 · Cited by 196
“The randomization feature of Anubis already intercepts the device control code IOCTL_STORAGE_QUERY_PROPERTY and the system call NtQueryVolumeInformationFile and forges the return information.”
MethodDarknet and deepnet mining for proactive cybersecurity threat intelligence
Nunes, E., Diab, A., Gunn, A., Marin, E., Mishra, V., Paliath, V., Robertson, J., Shakarian, J., Thart, A., & Shakarian, P. (2016) · 2016 IEEE Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI) · doi:10.1109/isi.2016.7745435 · Cited by 191
“Darknet and Deepnet Sites: Widely used for underground communication, “The Onion Router” (Tor) is free software dedicated to protect the privacy of its users by obscuring traffic analysis as a form of network surveillance [9].”
BackgroundPrio: Private, Robust, and Scalable Computation of Aggregate Statistics
Corrigan-Gibbs, H., & Boneh, D. (2017) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1703.06255 · Cited by 140
A Survey of Security Attacks in Information-Centric Networking
AbdAllah, E. G., Hassanein, H. S., & Zulkernine, M. (2015) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2015.2392629 · Cited by 201
“Existing solutions for naming related attacks, such as mix-nets [41], Tor [42], Freedom [43], Anonymizer [44], Freenet [45], and deniable encryption [46], cannot be applied in ICN as they are not designed for environments in which content is the main focus of the architecture.”
BackgroundDSSS-Based Flow Marking Technique for Invisible Traceback
Yu, W., Fu, X., Graham, S., Xuan, D., & Zhao, W. (2007) · 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07) · doi:10.1109/sp.2007.14 · Cited by 194
Metadata
- Authors
- Dingledine, R., Mathewson, N., & Syverson, P.
- Affiliations
- United States Naval Research Laboratory (US)
- Publisher
- Defense Technical Information Center
- Published
- 2004-01-01
- OpenAlex
- W1655958391
- Cited by
- 4,104
- References
- 46
- Citations by year
- 2026: 85 · 2025: 162 · 2024: 167 · 2023: 176 · 2022: 158 · 2021: 195 · 2020: 191 · 2019: 167 · 2018: 221 · 2017: 215 · 2016: 264 · 2015: 280 · 2014: 256 · 2013: 253 · 2012: 270
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Peer-to-Peer Network Technologies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Privacy, Security, and Data Protection
- Keywords
- Tor, onion routing, anonymous communication, forward secrecy, congestion control, directory servers, integrity verification, exit policy, rendezvous points, anonymity, network latency
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.