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Mapping the Ideological Marketplace
Abstract
I develop a method to measure the ideology of candidates and contributors using campaign finance data. Combined with a data set of over 100 million contribution records from state and federal elections, the method estimates ideal points for an expansive range of political actors. The common pool of contributors who give across institutions and levels of politics makes it possible to recover a unified set of ideological measures for members of Congress, the President and executive branch, state legislators, governors and other state officials, as well as the interest groups and individuals that make political donations. Since candidates fundraise regardless of incumbency status, the method estimates ideal points for both incumbents and non-incumbents. After establishing measure validity and addressing issues concerning strategic behavior, I present results for a variety of political actors and discuss several promising avenues of research made possible by the new measures.
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In the citing paper
“The ideological divide in American politics is at an historic high.”
From Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure (2020) · cites this paper as Bonica 2013
In the citing paper
“Ranking congressional legislators on a liberal-conservative scale, based either on their roll-call votes (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2016) or the political orientation of their campaign contributors (Bonica 2013), reveals that the gap between Democrats and Republicans has been widening since the late 1970s.”
From Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure (2020) · cites this paper as Bonica 2013
Citations
Cites
Beyond the Median: Voter Preferences, District Heterogeneity, and Political Representation
Gerber, E. R., & Lewis, J. B. (2004) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/424737 · Cited by 324 · cited 1×
“The common-space CFscores joins a fledgling literature on estimating ideal points for state politics (Aldrich and Battista 2002; Berry et al. 1998, 2007; Gerber and Lewis 2004; Kousser, Lewis, and Masket 2007; Shor and McCarty 2011; Wright 2007).”
Background
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure
Autor, D., Dorn, D., Hanson, G., & Majlesi, K. (2020) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20170011 · Cited by 1,063
Metadata
- Authors
- Bonica, A.
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2012
- Cited by
- 2
- References
- 1
- Type
- Preprint
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