CoChat

Why Prosocial Referral Incentives Work: The Interplay of Reputational Benefits and Action Costs

Open access
Gershon, Rachel, Cryder, Cynthia, John, Leslie K. · 2018 · SSRN Electronic Journal

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

While selfish incentives typically outperform prosocial incentives, in the context of customer referral rewards, prosocial incentives can be more effective. Companies frequently offer “selfish” (i.e., sender-benefiting) referral incentives, offering customers financial incentives for recruiting new customers. However, companies can alternatively offer “prosocial” (i.e., recipient-benefiting) referral incentives. In two field experiments and an incentive-compatible lab experiment, recipient-benefiting referrals recruited more new customers than sender-benefiting referrals. In five additional experiments, we test a process account that invokes two countervailing forces: reputational benefits and action costs. First, at the referral stage, senders anticipate reputational benefits for referring when recipients receive a reward. As a result, recipient-benefiting referrals are just as effective as sender-benefiting referrals at this stage. Second, at the uptake stage, recipient-benefiting referrals are more effective than sender-benefiting referrals: recipient-benefiting referrals directly incentivize uptake (i.e., signing up for a new product or service), which is a high-effort action in referral programs. The preponderance of sender-benefiting (vs. recipient-benefiting) referral offers in the marketplace suggests these effects are unanticipated by marketers who design incentive schemes.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.2139/ssrn.3176019

Cites

57 of 57 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

We couldn’t retrieve this paper’s full text, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Citations

Cites

Show all 57 references

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Abhijit Banerjee, 2010, Improving Immunization Coverage in Rural India: Clustered Randomised Controlled Evaluation of Immunization Campaigns with and without Incentives, BMJ
  2. Ravi Bapna, 2014, Analyzing the Impact of Incentive Structure on the Diffusion of Mobile Social Games: A Randomized Field Experiment, Workshop on Information Systems and Economics (WISE)
  3. Brandon Gains, 2017, The 51 Best Referral Program Examples of 2016, Saasquatch

Cited by

Still being checked.

Metadata

Authors
Gershon, R., Cryder, C., & John, L. K.
Affiliations
  • University of California San Diego (US)
  • Washington University in St. Louis (US)
  • Harvard University (US)
Corresponding author
Gershon, Rachel
Venue
SSRN Electronic Journal
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2018
ISSN
1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3122393733
Cited by
0
References
57
Type
posted content
Language
en
Open access
Locations
SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Digital Marketing and Social Media
Keywords
referral rewards, customer referral programs, reputational benefits, action costs, customer acquisition, referral uptake, incentive design

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.