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PreprintCited by 34Taxation and Compliance StudiesCorruption and Economic DevelopmentExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

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Effects of Institutional History and Leniency on Collusive Corruption and Tax Evasion

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Buckenmaier, Johannes, Dimant, Eugen, Mittone, Luigi·2018·Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
DOI 10.2139/ssrn.3228415
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Abstract

We investigate the effects of an institutional mechanism that incentivizes taxpayers to blow the whistle on collusive corruption and tax compliance. We explore this through a formal leniency program. In our experiment, we nest collusive corruption within a tax evasion framework. We not only study the effect of the presence of such a mechanism on behavior, but also the dynamic effect caused by the introduction and the removal of leniency. We find that in the presence of a leniency mechanism, subjects collude and accept bribes less often while paying more taxes, but there is no increase in bribe offers. Our results show that the introduction of the opportunity to blow the whistle decreases the collusion and bribe acceptance rate, and increases the collected tax yield. It also does not encourage bribe offers. In contrast, the removal of the institutional mechanism does not induce negative effects, suggesting a positive spillover effect of leniency that persists even after the mechanism has been removed.

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Metadata

Authors
Buckenmaier, J., Dimant, E., & Mittone, L.
Affiliations
  • University of Zurich (CH)
  • University of Nottingham (GB)
  • University of Trento (IT)
Corresponding author
Dimant, Eugen
ORCID
Venue
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2018
Volume
175
Pages
296-313
ISSN
0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.2139/ssrn.3228415
OpenAlex
W2782799748
Cited by
34
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 2
FWCI
6.16
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
  • Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (acceptedVersion, other-oa)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
  • Institutional Research Information System (Università degli Studi di Trento) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich)
Funders
  • California Department of Fish and Game (AL-1169/3-2, AL-1169/5-1)
  • University of Pennsylvania
  • Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
  • Universität zu Köln
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Keywords
leniency programs, whistleblowing, collusion, tax evasion, corruption, bribery, tax compliance, institutional history, tax yield

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