Corporate Governance and Long-Run Risk Premia
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 91 of the 93 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 2 are not checked yet.
Abstract
Understanding the asset-pricing implications of corporate governance has been a challenge for at least the last two decades. As evidenced by the literature, the balance of power between insiders and outside investors should play a significant role in shedding light on this challenge (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; LaPorta et al., 2000a, 2002; Morellec (2004); Lambrecht and Myers, 2008). Corporate finance models with agency costs operate in a riskless environment and so do not make predictions on the risk premium, whereas the ones that do make predictions do so empirically without a model. This paper provides a theoretical solution to this issue by introducing business-cycle risk and Epstein-Zin investors into corporate finance models with agency conflicts. Unlike the literature, we use the term governance risk, measured by the (lagged) instruments of governance indices instead of agency costs, proxied by the actual governance indices in the literature. On the empirical side, this paper eliminates the endogeneity problems embedded into governance indices through the use of the instruments of these indices instead. We also show that firms that have higher governance risk in bad vs. good economy periods for the economy have higher equity premiums. We built a dynamic consumption-based corporate finance model with both business cycles and governance risk, in which state-dependent optimal financing, default, and refinancing decisions are endogenously determined. We focus on the total risk premium, although the business cycle risk drives most of the equity risk premium, as shown in Dorion, Ekponon and Jeanneret (2020). Similar to corporate finance models with agency conflicts, we find that higher governance risk leads insiders to use debt more conservatively. By plugging in an asset pricing framework to these aforementioned models, we show that less debt subsequently produces low equity premium, thus providing a theoretical explanation to Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and others’ findings. We also contribute to creating more links between agency conflicts and equity prices. Because governance risk is time-varying, in bad times, firms with greater governance risk see their equity valuation fluctuate more over the business cycle.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1986) · Cited by 17,275
Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests
Fama, E. F., & MacBeth, J. D. (1973) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260061 · Cited by 14,258
Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches
Petersen, M. A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn053 · Cited by 10,746
Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1996) · Corporate Bankruptcy · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609435.005 · Cited by 9,306
A five-factor asset pricing model
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.10.010 · Cited by 7,852
Investor protection and corporate governance
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9 · Cited by 6,848
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Risks for the Long Run: A Potential Resolution of Asset Pricing Puzzles
Bansal, R., & Yaron, A. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00670.x · Cited by 4,242
The market for corporate control
Jensen, M. C., & Ruback, R. S. (1983) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(83)90004-1 · Cited by 4,141
Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation
La Porta, R., Lopez‐De‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00457 · Cited by 4,050
Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies
Stulz, R. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90011-n · Cited by 3,675
Does corporate social responsibility affect the cost of capital?
El Ghoul, S., Guedhami, O., Kwok, C. C. Y., & Mishra, D. R. (2011) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2011.02.007 · Cited by 3,465
What Matters in Corporate Governance?
Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn099 · Cited by 2,906
R2 around the world: New theory and new tests☆
JIN, L., & MYERS, S. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.11.003 · Cited by 2,816
Corporate Debt Value, Bond Covenants, and Optimal Capital Structure
LELAND, H. E. (1994) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb02452.x · Cited by 2,729
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
Ang, J. S., Cole, R. A., & Lin, J. W. (2000) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00201 · Cited by 2,500
With or Without U? The Appropriate Test for a U-Shaped Relationship*: Practitionersâ Corner
Lind, J. T., & Mehlum, H. (2010) · Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0084.2009.00569.x · Cited by 2,342
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1989) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(89)90099-8 · Cited by 2,151
Corporate Yield Spreads: Default Risk or Liquidity? New Evidence from the Credit Default Swap Market
LONGSTAFF, F. A., MITHAL, S., & NEIS, E. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00797.x · Cited by 2,087
The Extreme Value Method for Estimating the Variance of the Rate of Return
Parkinson, M. (1980) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296071 · Cited by 1,935
Dynamic Capital Structure Choice: Theory and Tests
FISCHER, E. O., HEINKEL, R., & ZECHNER, J. (1989) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb02402.x · Cited by 1,571
On the Estimation of Security Price Volatilities from Historical Data
Garman, M. B., & Klass, M. J. (1980) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296072 · Cited by 1,533
Simple formulas for standard errors that cluster by both firm and time
Thompson, S. B. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.08.016 · Cited by 1,512
Agency Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure
Leland, H. E. (1998) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00051 · Cited by 1,496
Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?
Hall, B. J., & Liebman, J. B. (1998) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355398555702 · Cited by 1,308
Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices
CREMERS, K. J. M., & NAIR, V. B. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00819.x · Cited by 1,220
The Economic Theory of ‘Managerial’ Capitalism
Marris, R. (1964) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-81732-0 · Cited by 1,196
The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm
Alchian, A. A., & Williamson, O. E. (1965) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1910367 · Cited by 973
Do Tests of Capital Structure Theory Mean What They Say?
STREBULAEV, I. A. (2007) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01256.x · Cited by 962
An EBIT‐Based Model of Dynamic Capital Structure
Goldstein, R., Ju, N., & Leland, H. (2001) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/322893 · Cited by 955
Dynamic Capital Structure Under Managerial EntrenchmentPreprint
Zwiebel, J. (1995) · American Economic Review · Cited by 944
Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1994) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w4886 · Cited by 900
Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms
Singh, M., & Davidson III, W. N. (2003) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(01)00260-6 · Cited by 866
Estimating the Price of Default Risk
Duffee, G. R. (1999) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/12.1.197 · Cited by 724
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P. A., Ishii, J. L., & Metrick, A. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.278920 · Cited by 703
Capital structure, credit risk, and macroeconomic conditions
Hackbarth, D., Miao, J., & Morellec, E. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.10.003 · Cited by 678
Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous‐Time Agency Model
DeMARZO, P. M., & SANNIKOV, Y. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01002.x · Cited by 637
The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm.
O'Connell, J., & Williamson, O. E. (1965) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2552785 · Cited by 580
Macroeconomic Conditions and the Puzzles of Credit Spreads and Capital Structure
CHEN, H. (2010) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01613.x · Cited by 563
A NOTE ON USING CROSS‐SECTIONAL INFORMATION IN BAYESIAN ESTIMATION OF SECURITY BETAS
Vasicek, O. A. (1973) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01452.x · Cited by 472
CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: an Empirical Investigation of UK Panel Data
Ozkan, N. (2011) · European Financial Management · doi:10.1111/j.1468-036x.2009.00511.x · Cited by 381
The Long-Run Risks Model and Aggregate Asset Prices: An Empirical Assessment
Beeler, J. (2012) · Critical Finance Review · doi:10.1561/104.00000004 · Cited by 368
Can Managerial Discretion Explain Observed Leverage Ratios?
Morellec, E. (2004) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhg036 · Cited by 360
Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Dynamics
MORELLEC, E., NIKOLOV, B., & SCHÜRHOFF, N. (2012) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01735.x · Cited by 358
Takeovers and the Cross-Section of Returns
Cremers, K. J. M., Nair, V. B., & John, K. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn032 · Cited by 329
On the Debt Capacity of Growth Options*
Barclay, M. J., Smith, Jr., & Morellec, E. (2006) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/497404 · Cited by 313
Governance Mechanisms and Bond Prices
Cremers, K. J. M., Nair, V. B., & Wei, C. (2007) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/revfin/hhm006 · Cited by 294
Do Tests of Capital Structure Theory Mean What They Say?Preprint
Strebulaev, I. A. (2004) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.556697 · Cited by 290
The Levered Equity Risk Premium and Credit Spreads: A Unified Framework
Bhamra, H. S., Kuehn, L.-A., & Strebulaev, I. A. (2010) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhp082 · Cited by 273
The Aggregate Dynamics of Capital Structure and Macroeconomic Risk
Bhamra, H. S., Kuehn, L.-A., & Strebulaev, I. A. (2010) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhq075 · Cited by 271
Incentive Pay and the Market for CEOs: An Analysis of Pay-For-Performance Sensitivity
Himmelberg, C. P., & Hubbard, R. G. G. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.236089 · Cited by 250
Agency Conflicts, Investment, and Asset Pricing
ALBUQUERUE, R., & WANG, N. (2008) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01309.x · Cited by 244
Macroeconomic Conditions and the Puzzles of Credit Spreads and Capital Structure
Chen, H. (2010) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w16151 · Cited by 234
Investor Protection, Equity Returns, and Financial Globalization
Giannetti, M., & Koskinen, Y. (2010) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109009990524 · Cited by 229
A Lintner Model of Payout and Managerial Rents
LAMBRECHT, B. M., & MYERS, S. C. (2012) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01772.x · Cited by 226
Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs
Daines, R. (2001) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/17.1.83 · Cited by 219
Board classification and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from the market for corporate control
Bates, T. W., Becher, D. A., & Lemmon, M. L. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.03.007 · Cited by 210
Thirty Years of Shareholder Rights and Firm Value
CREMERS, M., & FERRELL, A. (2014) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12138 · Cited by 204
Florackis, C., & Ozkan, A. (2009) · European Financial Management · doi:10.1111/j.1468-036x.2007.00418.x · Cited by 201
Is History Repeating Itself? The (Un)predictable Past of ESG RatingsPreprint
Berg, F., Fabisik, K., & Sautner, Z. (2020) · doi:10.67929/ecgi-fin-708-2020 · Cited by 195
Horses and Rabbits? Trade-Off Theory and Optimal Capital Structure
Ju, N., Parrino, R., Poteshman, A. M., & Weisbach, M. S. (2005) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109000002301 · Cited by 189
ESGM: ESG scores and the Missing pillar
Şahin, Ö., Bax, K., Czado, C., & Paterlini, S. (2021) · Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management · doi:10.1002/csr.2326 · Cited by 151
CEO tenure: An integrative review and pathways for future research
Darouichi, A., Kunisch, S., Menz, M., & Cannella, A. A. (2021) · Corporate Governance An International Review · doi:10.1111/corg.12396 · Cited by 148
Do Takeover Defense Indices Measure Takeover Deterrence?
Karpoff, J. M., Schonlau, R. J., & Wehrly, E. W. (2015) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhx025 · Cited by 128
The Levered Equity Risk Premium and Credit Spreads: A Unified FrameworkPreprint
Bhamra, H. S., Kuehn, L., & Strebulaev, I. A. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1016891 · Cited by 125
Debt and managerial rents in a real-options model of the firm
Lambrecht, B. M., & Myers, S. C. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.007 · Cited by 112
Brochet, F., Limbach, P., Schmid, M., & Scholz-Daneshgari, M. (2021) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/tar-2019-0295 · Cited by 108
CEO Career Concerns in Early Tenure and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Reporting
Chen, L., Liao, C., Tsang, A., & Yu, L. G. (2017) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1911-3846.12874 · Cited by 105
Corporate Governance and Capital Structure DynamicsPreprint
Morellec, E., Nikolov, B., & Schürhoff, N. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1106164 · Cited by 100
The Aggregate Dynamics of Capital Structure and Macroeconomic RiskPreprint
Bhamra, H. S., Kuehn, L., & Strebulaev, I. A. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1265870 · Cited by 97
The Dynamics of Investment, Payout and Debt
Lambrecht, B. M., & Myers, S. C. (2017) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhx081 · Cited by 94
Learning About CEO Ability and Stock Return VolatilityPreprint
Pan, Y., Wang, T. Y., & Weisbach, M. S. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2228136 · Cited by 82
Thirty Years of Shareholder Rights and Firm ValuationPreprint
Cremers, M., & Ferrell, A. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1413133 · Cited by 75
How Management Risk Affects Corporate Debt
Pan, Y., Wang, T. Y., & Weisbach, M. S. (2016) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhx071 · Cited by 70
The Law and Finance of Anti-Takeover StatutesPreprint
Catan, E., & Kahan, M. (2014) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2517594 · Cited by 67
Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and GovernancePreprint
Klausner, M. D. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2297640 · Cited by 55
Consumption Volatility and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns
Tédongap, R. (2014) · European Finance Review · doi:10.1093/rof/rft058 · Cited by 55
Environmental, social, and governance reporting in family firms: The critical role of CEO attributes
Seow, R. Y. C. (2024) · Business Strategy and the Environment · doi:10.1002/bse.3984 · Cited by 49
ESG Ratings and Financial Performance in the Global Hospitality Industry
Lu, K., Onuk, C. B., Xia, Y., & Zhang, J. (2025) · Journal of risk and financial management · doi:10.3390/jrfm18010024 · Cited by 49
Agency Conflicts, Investment, and Asset PricingPreprint
Albuquerque, R. A., & Wang, N. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.637303 · Cited by 48
Cao, X., Im, J., & Syed, I. (2021) · Group & Organization Management · doi:10.1177/1059601121989575 · Cited by 28
Asset Pricing with Persistence Risk
Andrei, D., Hasler, M., & Jeanneret, A. (2017) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhy121 · Cited by 25
Corporate Governance and Costs of Equity: Theory and Evidence
Li, D., & Li, E. X. N. (2018) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2016.2570 · Cited by 22
Consumption Volatility and the Cross-Section of Stock ReturnsPreprint
Tédongap, R. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.983982 · Cited by 19
Governance and firm value: The effect of a recession
Dah, M. A. (2016) · Research in International Business and Finance · doi:10.1016/j.ribaf.2016.01.013 · Cited by 19
Easy cleanups or forbearing improvements: The effect of CEO tenure on successor’s performance
Çolak, G., & Liljeblom, E. (2022) · Journal of Financial Stability · doi:10.1016/j.jfs.2022.101072 · Cited by 19
Macroeconomic Risk, Investor Preferences, and Sovereign Credit Spreads
de Andrade, S. C., Ekponon, A., & Jeanneret, A. (2018) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2022.07.003 · Cited by 19
Self-citationA Demand‐Side Theory of Antitakeover Defenses
Hannes, S. (2006) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/505051 · Cited by 13
Marking to Market Corporate DebtPreprint
Bretscher, L., Feldhütter, P., Kane, A., et al. (2020) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3681817 · Cited by 13
How Does Corporate Governance Affect Equity Volatility? Worldwide Evidence and Theory
Gagnon, L., & Jeanneret, A. (2025) · The Review of Corporate Finance Studies · doi:10.1093/rcfs/cfad002 · Cited by 8
CEO-Firm Match Quality, Entrenchment, and the Relation Between CEO Tenure and Firm Value
Limbach, P., Schmid, M., & Scholz-Daneshgari, M. (2017) · Alexandria (UniSG) (University of St.Gallen) · Cited by 2
CEO Tenure and the Cost of Equity Capital
Pae, S., Kim, H. T., & Her, Y. (2023) · Journal of Applied Business and Economics · doi:10.33423/jabe.v25i4.6342
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- W Baumol, 1959, Business Behavior
- C Dorion, 2026, What drives expected stock returns? Long-run risk and endogenous leverage
Metadata
- Authors
- Ekponon, A.
- Affiliations
- University of Ottawa (CA)
- Corresponding author
- Ekponon, Adelphe
- ORCID
- Ekponon, Adelphe
- Venue
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2019
- ISSN
- 1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2992781555
- Semantic Scholar
- 86c9edd78a4d151a049533fefbf73fa1d8d16d73
- Cited by
- 0
- References
- 83
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Financial Management
- Keywords
- corporate governance, risk premium, agency costs, ESG ratings, CEO turnover, business cycles, stock returns, leverage, business growth, governance quality, endogeneity
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.