The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Business Associations and Economic Development: Why Some Associations Contribute More Than Others
Abstract
Most current theoretical treatments view business associations as rent-seeking, special interest groups. Yet, empirical research in a wide range of developing countries reveals a broad range of functions and activities undertaken by business associations, many of which promote efficiency. These positive functions address crucial development issues (emphasized in the New Institutional Economics) such as strengthening property rights, facilitating vertical and horizontal coordination, reducing information costs, and upgrading worker training. The associations that engage in these developmental activities tend to be well organized and staffed. This institutional strength depends in turn on high member density, valuable selective benefits (often delegated by governments), and effective internal mediation of member interests. In addition external factors, especially competitive markets and government pressure, encourage associations to use their institutional strength for productive ends.
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Gereffi, G., & Lee, J. (2016) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-014-2373-7 · Cited by 742
Doner, R. F., Ritchie, B. K., & Slater, D. (2005) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818305050113 · Cited by 709
Self-citationBusiness politics and the state in twentieth-century Latin America
(2005) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.42-4273 · Cited by 265
Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of Foreign Investment
JOHNS, L., & WELLHAUSEN, R. L. (2016) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s000305541500057x · Cited by 185
Taxation and State Building: Towards a Governance Focused Tax Reform Agenda
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Metadata
- Authors
- Doner, R. F., & Schneider, B. R.
- Venue
- Business and Politics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2000-11
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 261-288
- ISSN
- 1369-5258 (ISSN-L)
- 1469-3569
- OpenAlex
- W1984663208
- Cited by
- 402
- References
- 49
- FWCI
- 6.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.