Assignment of Moral Responsibility and Punishment
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
SHULTZ, THOMAS R.; WRIGHT, KEVIN; and SCHLEIFER, MICHAEL. Assignment of Moral Responsibility and Punishment. CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1986, 57, 177-184. A theory of the assignment of moral responsibility and punishment for harm was tested with children 5-11 years of age. The results indicated a fairly sophisticated use of a variety of moral concepts by children from 5 years of age. They showed evidence of knowing that judgments of moral responsibility are presupposed by judgments of punishment and that causal judgments are presupposed by moral responsibility judgments. They also used information on intention and negligence to assign moral responsibility and information on restitution to assign punishment. Developmental trends included an increasing sensitivity to these concepts, greater tolerance for harm doing, and more emphasis on restitution rather than punishment with increasing age.
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In the citing paper
“When moral scenarios present con- flicting information about the outcome of an action and the intention of the actor, young children's moral judgments and justifications are determined by the action's outcome rather than the actor's intention (9–13).”
From The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment (2007) · cites this paper as [11]
In the citing paper
“As children mature, they become progressively more likely to make the opposite judgment (11, 14–19).”
From The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment (2007) · cites this paper as [11]
In the citing paper
“Previous studies have demonstrated people making moral judgments depending more substantially on beliefs and intentions rather than on results and consequences (Surber, 1977; Shultz et al., 1986; Baird and Moses, 2001; Baird and Astington, 2004).”
From tDCS Over DLPFC Leads to Less Utilitarian Response in Moral-Personal Judgment (2018) · cites this paper as Shultz et al., 1986
Citations
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Cited by
Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment
Cushman, F. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.006 · Cited by 990
Malle, B. F., Guglielmo, S., & Monroe, A. E. (2014) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2014.877340 · Cited by 632
The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment
Young, L., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Saxe, R. (2007) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0701408104 · Cited by 625
The development of intent-based moral judgment
Cushman, F., Sheketoff, R., Wharton, S., & Carey, S. (2013) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.11.008 · Cited by 396
The Neural Correlates of Third-Party Punishment
Buckholtz, J. W., Asplund, C. L., Dux, P. E., Zald, D. H., Gore, J. C., Jones, O. D., & Marois, R. (2008) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2008.10.016 · Cited by 392
Metadata
- Authors
- Shultz, T. R., Wright, K., & Schleifer, M.
- Venue
- Child Development
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1986-02
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 177
- ISSN
- 0009-3920 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2061266088
- Cited by
- 117
- References
- 37
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 5
- FWCI
- 1.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Child Development (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Emotions and Moral Behavior
- Keywords
- moral responsibility, punishment, moral judgment, children's moral development, intention, negligence, restitution, causal judgment
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