The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Competition and Market Power in Option Demand Markets
Abstract
We call markets in which intermediaries sell networks of suppliers to consumers who are uncertain about their needs "option demand markets." In these markets, suppliers may grant the intermediaries discounts in order to be admitted to their networks. We derive a measure of each supplier's market power within the network; the measure is based on the additional ex ante expected utility consumers obtain from the supplier's inclusion. We empirically validate the WTP measure by considering managed care purchases of hospital services in the San Diego market. Finally, we present three applications, including an analysis of hospital mergers in San Diego.
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Citations
Cites
Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium
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Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts
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The effects of market structure and bargaining position on hospital prices
Melnick, G. A., Zwanziger, J., Bamezai, A., & Pattison, R. (1992) · Journal of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/0167-6296(92)90001-h · Cited by 279
Common Marketing Agency as a Device for Facilitating Collusion
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The changing effects of competition on non-profit and for-profit hospital pricing behavior
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Cited by
The Price Ain’t Right? Hospital Prices and Health Spending on the Privately Insured*
Cooper, Z., Craig, S. V., Gaynor, M., & Van Reenen, J. (2019) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjy020 · Cited by 575
Mergers When Prices Are Negotiated: Evidence from the Hospital Industry
Gowrisankaran, G., Nevo, A., & Town, R. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20130223 · Cited by 393
The Industrial Organization of Health-Care Markets
Gaynor, M., Ho, K., & Town, R. J. (2015) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.53.2.235 · Cited by 349
Insurer-Provider Networks in the Medical Care Market
Ho, K. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.1.393 · Cited by 299
Paying a Premium on Your Premium? Consolidation in the US Health Insurance Industry
Dafny, L., Duggan, M., & Ramanarayanan, S. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.2.1161 · Cited by 291
Do increasing markups matter? Lessons from empirical industrial organization
Berry, S., Gaynor, M., & Morton, F. S. (2019) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.33.3.44 · Cited by 235
Metadata
- Authors
- Capps, C., Dranove, D., & Satterthwaite, M.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2003
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 737
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123694758
- Cited by
- 293
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 9.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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