The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
On Moral Hazard and Insurance
Abstract
I. Introduction, 541.—II. The model, 542.—III. Moral hazard when care is not observed by the insurer, 544.—IV. Moral hazard when care is observed by the insurer, 550.—Appendix, 561.
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Citations
Cites
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204
Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping
Stiglitz, J. E. (1974) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296714 · Cited by 1,429
Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship
Shavell, S. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003319 · Cited by 1,285
Self-citationMarket Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection
Ehrlich, I., & Becker, G. S. (1992) · Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7957-5_8 · Cited by 1,060
Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90073-5 · Cited by 942
Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
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Insurance, Information, and Individual Action
Spence, A., & Zeckhauser, R. (1971) · American Economic Review · Cited by 610
Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate incentives
Zeckhauser, R. (1970) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(70)90010-4 · Cited by 595
Newhouse, J. P., & Taylor, V. (1969) · Cited by 583
Insurance, Information, and Individual Action
Spence, M., & Zeckhauser, R. (1978) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-214850-7.50027-9 · Cited by 145
Cited by
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1992) · Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7957-5_16 · Cited by 1,913
Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets
Greenwald, B. C., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1986) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1891114 · Cited by 1,353
Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship
Shavell, S. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003319 · Cited by 1,285
Self-citationThe Analytics of Uncertainty and Information
Hirshleifer, J., & Riley, J. G. (1992) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139167635 · Cited by 842
Shavell, S. (1986) · International Review of Law and Economics · doi:10.1016/0144-8188(86)90038-4 · Cited by 495
Self-citationTesting for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets
Cohen, A., & Siegelman, P. (2010) · Journal of Risk and Insurance · doi:10.1111/j.1539-6975.2009.01337.x · Cited by 418
Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implications
Chiappori, P.-A., Jullien, B., Salanié, B., & Salanié, F. (2006) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00057.x · Cited by 312
Index Insurance for Developing Countries
Miranda, M. J., & Farrin, K. (2012) · Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy · doi:10.1093/aepp/pps031 · Cited by 310
The Political Economy of ``Natural'' Disasters
Cohen, C., & Werker, E. D. (2008) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002708322157 · Cited by 266
Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
Rubinstein, A., & Yaari, M. E. (1983) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90094-7 · Cited by 265
Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation
Gholz, E., Press, D. G., & Sapolsky, H. M. (1997) · International Security · doi:10.1162/isec.21.4.5 · Cited by 264
Deductible Contracts Against Fraudulent Claims: Evidence from Automobile Insurance
Dionne, G., & Gagné, R. (2001) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/00346530151143824 · Cited by 67
Formal and Informal Contracting: Theory and Evidence
Gil, R., & Zanarone, G. (2017) · Annual Review of Law and Social Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110316-113413 · Cited by 56
Switching motivation and moral hazard: evidence from automobile physical damage insurance in Taiwan
Liu, C.-T., Wu, J.-Y., & Chang, C.-H. (2020) · The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice · doi:10.1057/s41288-019-00158-2 · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Shavell, S.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1979-11
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 541
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2152734002
- Cited by
- 678
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 17.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.