The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
Abstract
Etude d'un jeu de negociation strategique sequentiel avec information incomplete. Caracterisation d'une classe d'equilibres sequentiels appeles equilibres sequentiels de negociation et demonstration de l'unicite de cet equilibre
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Citations
Cites
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Rubinstein, A. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912531 · Cited by 5,264
Self-citationNash, J. (1953) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1906951 · Cited by 3,177
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model
Harsanyi, J. C. (2004) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0270 · Cited by 2,127
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
Harsanyi, J. C. (1968) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.14.5.320 · Cited by 988
Axiomatic Models of Bargaining
Roth, A. E. (1979) · Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-51570-5 · Cited by 801
A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
Harsanyi, J. C., & Selten, R. (1972) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.18.5.80 · Cited by 580
Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit
Selten, R. (1965) · Cited by 559
Infinite-horizon models of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information
Fudenberg, D., Levine, D., & Tirole, J. (1985) · Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528309.006 · Cited by 332
A Multistage Model of Bargaining
Sobel, J., & Takahashi, I. (1983) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297673 · Cited by 316
Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information
Myerson, R. B. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911499 · Cited by 210
Cited by
The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information
Hirshleifer, J., & Riley, J. G. (1992) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139167635 · Cited by 842
Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture
Gul, F., Sonnenschein, H., & Wilson, R. (1986) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(86)90024-4 · Cited by 700
International cooperation and institutional choice: the European Community's internal market
Garrett, G. (1992) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300027806 · Cited by 676
Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model
Camerer, C., & Weigelt, K. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911840 · Cited by 572
Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
Sutton, J. (1986) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297715 · Cited by 587
Perfect sequential equilibrium
Grossman, S. J., & Perry, M. (1986) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(86)90022-0 · Cited by 379
The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations
SLANTCHEV, B. L. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000911 · Cited by 367
Güth, W., & Kocher, M. G. (2014) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2014.06.006 · Cited by 362
Information, fairness, and efficiency in bargaining
Camerer, C. F., & Loewenstein, G. (1993) · Psychological Perspectives on Justice · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511552069.009 · Cited by 55
The Causes of Impasses in Labor Disputes
BABCOCK, L. C., & OLSON, C. A. (1992) · Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society · doi:10.1111/j.1468-232x.1992.tb00313.x · Cited by 28
“These models show that if there is incomplete information (uncertainty) about an opponent, rational strategies may produce an impasse even if a positive contract zone exists (Rubinstein, 1985; Crampton, 1984).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Rubinstein, A.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1985-09
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1151
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2018695448
- Cited by
- 452
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 11.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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