The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
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Citations
Cites
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Metadata
- Authors
- Harris, M., & Townsend, R. M.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1981-01
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 33
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1970235050
- Cited by
- 434
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 80.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.