The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Social Choice and Individual Values.
Shackle, G. L. S., & Arrow, K. J. (1951) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2549613 · Cited by 7,792
Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
McKelvey, R. D. (1976) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(76)90040-5 · Cited by 1,339
Self-citationA Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility Under Majority Rule
Plott, C. R. (1967) · CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) · Cited by 919
An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process
Davis, O. A., Hinich, M. J., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1970) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1953842 · Cited by 744
Farquharson, R. (1969) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 608
Cited by
Legislative leviathan: party government in the House
(1993) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.31-0579 · Cited by 2,313
Weingast, B. R., & Marshall, W. J. (1988) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261528 · Cited by 1,527
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
Shepsle, K. A. (1979) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110770 · Cited by 1,483
An agenda for the study of institutions
Ostrom, E. (1986) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00239556 · Cited by 1,166
Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems
Cox, G. W. (1990) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111465 · Cited by 869
Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice
Shepsle, K. A., & Weingast, B. R. (1981) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00133748 · Cited by 779
Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions
Riker, W. H. (1980) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1960638 · Cited by 767
The Possibility of Social Choice
Sen, A. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.3.349 · Cited by 763
Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach
Shepsle, K. A. (1989) · Journal of Theoretical Politics · doi:10.1177/0951692889001002002 · Cited by 727
Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions
Riker, W. H. (1982) · Studies in Public Choice · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-7380-0_1 · Cited by 646
Budge, I. (1994) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123400006955 · Cited by 497
A Dead Senator Tells No Lies: Seniority and the Distribution of Federal Benefits
Roberts, B. E. (1990) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111510 · Cited by 473
Coalitions and Cabinet Government
Laver, M., & Shepsle, K. A. (1990) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1962770 · Cited by 447
Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States
MILLER, G., & SCHOFIELD, N. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000650 · Cited by 398
Goodin, R. E. (1996) · The Theory of Institutional Design · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511558320.002 · Cited by 390
The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure
McCubbins, M. D. (1985) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111178 · Cited by 388
Legislative choice of regulatory forms: Legal process or administrative process?
Fiorina, M. (1982) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00242147 · Cited by 376
Elections, Parties, Democracy: Conferring the Median Mandate
McDonald, M. D., & Budge, I. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199286728.001.0001 · Cited by 342
Beyond the Median: Voter Preferences, District Heterogeneity, and Political Representation
Gerber, E. R., & Lewis, J. B. (2004) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/424737 · Cited by 324
Tullock, G. (1981) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00138239 · Cited by 318
Cooter, R. D. (2000) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691214504 · Cited by 300
Miller, N. R. (1983) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1957271 · Cited by 286
Governing the Firm: Workers' Control in Theory and Practice
Dow, G. K. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511615849 · Cited by 278
Leadership: What It Means, What It Does, and What We Want to Know About It
Ahlquist, J. S., & Levi, M. (2011) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-042409-152654 · Cited by 277
Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior
Denzau, A. T., & Mackay, R. J. (1983) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110891 · Cited by 269
Taagepera, R., & Grofman, B. (1985) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.1985.tb00130.x · Cited by 268
Riker, W. H. (1984) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1961245 · Cited by 256
Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data
Bapat, N. A., & Clifton Morgan, T. (2009) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00569.x · Cited by 230
Metadata
- Authors
- McKelvey, R. D.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1979-09
- Volume
- 47
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1085
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1982285343
- Cited by
- 696
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 27.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.