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Finitely Repeated Games
Open accessAbstract
We study subgame perfect equilibria of finitely repeated games. We prove a limit "folk theorem" for these games. Under weak conditions, any feasible and individually rational payoff vector of the one-shot game can be approximated by the average payoff in a perfect equilibrium of a repeated game with a sufficiently long horizon.
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Benoit, J.-P., & Krishna, V.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1985-07
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 905
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2065567313
- Cited by
- 516
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 20.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.