The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory
Abstract
The problem of absolute and relative gains divides neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism. The former assumes states focus primarily on their absolute gains and emphasizes the prospects for cooperation. The latter supposes states are largely concerned with relative gains and emphasizes the prospects for conflict. Existing work in international relations theory generally traces the differences between these two theories to different assumptions about states' preferences. Using a simple game-theoretic model, this essay offers a reformulation of the problem of absolute and relative gains that links changes in the states' behavior, the feasibility of cooperation, and especially the states' concern for relative versus absolute gains explicitly to changes in the constraints facing the states. Many of the differences between neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism appear as special cases of the model.
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Citations
Cites
War and Change in World Politics
Gilpin, R. (1981) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511664267 · Cited by 4,020
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
Cooperation under the security dilemma
Jervis, R. (1978) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2009958 · Cited by 2,305
Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation
Johnson, H. G. (1953) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296006 · Cited by 666
Cited by
Social Theory of International Politics
Wendt, A. (1999) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511612183 · Cited by 7,664
Rationalist explanations for war
Fearon, J. D. (1995) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300033324 · Cited by 3,995
Choosing union: monetary politics and Maastricht
Sandholtz, W. (1993) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300004690 · Cited by 377
Halevy, N., Bornstein, G., & Sagiv, L. (2008) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02100.x · Cited by 355
Metadata
- Authors
- Powell, R.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1991-12
- Volume
- 85
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1303-1320
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W1980544050
- Cited by
- 565
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 70.41
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Powell, R. (1991). Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory. American Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/1963947
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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