The DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government
Abstract
Presidents often lack legislative majorities, but situations of opposition-party majorities (“divided government”) are much less common outside the United States. The president's party's share of seats tends to increase in early-term elections but decline in later elections. Thus opposition majorities often result after midterm elections. Opposition majorities rarely occur in elections held concurrently with the presidential election but are more likely to do so if legislators enjoy electoral independence from their parties due to features of electoral laws.
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Franklin, M. N., Eijk, C. V. D., Evans, D., Fotos, M., Hirczy de Mino, W., Marsh, M., & Wessels, B. (2004) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511616884 · Cited by 1,421
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Posner, D. N. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808661 · Cited by 1,113
Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement
Solt, F. (2008) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00298.x · Cited by 946
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Walle, N. V. D., & Posner, D. N. (2005) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20031830 · Cited by 647
Electoral institutions, cleavage structures, and the number of parties
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Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil
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Is Gender like Ethnicity? The Political Representation of Identity Groups
Htun, M. (2004) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592704040241 · Cited by 391
Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions
Filippov, M., Ordeshook, P. C., & Shvetsova, O. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610875 · Cited by 366
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS
Powell, G. B. (2004) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104815 · Cited by 334
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Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions
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Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes
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Making Constitutions: Presidents, Parties, and Institutional Choice in Latin America
Negretto, G. L. (2013) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139207836 · Cited by 239
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS
Powell, G. B. (2004) · xxxx · doi:10.50505/nlmtest4 · Cited by 35
Metadata
- Authors
- Shugart, M. S.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1995-06-01
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 327-343
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2162391660
- Cited by
- 343
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 21.99
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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