The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion
Abstract
This paper investigates the design of administrative procedures when policy consequences are uncertain. In general, when deciding how much discretion to delegate, legislators must trade off informational gains from agency expertise and distributive losses from bureaucratic drift. We show that when Congress has both ex post agenda control and access to information, it will delegate a large degree of authority to all agencies, regardless of differences in policy preferences. This discretionary floor rises as future events become more uncertain. We further show that the possibility of coalitional drift, or changing preferences of the median legislator, may lead either to hard-wired agencies with little authority or soft-wired agencies with large powers to set policy.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-6536 · Cited by 910
The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU
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Mapping the Ideological Marketplace
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Pathologies of accountability: ICANN and the challenge of “multiple accountabilities disorder”
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Predicting Public Sector Accountability: From Agency Drift to Forum Drift
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Metadata
- Authors
- Epstein, D., & O'Halloran, S.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1994-08
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 697
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2328190647
- Cited by
- 447
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 16.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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