The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion
Abstract
This paper investigates the design of administrative procedures when policy consequences are uncertain. In general, when deciding how much discretion to delegate, legislators must trade off informational gains from agency expertise and distributive losses from bureaucratic drift. We show that when Congress has both ex post agenda control and access to information, it will delegate a large degree of authority to all agencies, regardless of differences in policy preferences. This discretionary floor rises as future events become more uncertain. We further show that the possibility of coalitional drift, or changing preferences of the median legislator, may lead either to hard-wired agencies with little authority or soft-wired agencies with large powers to set policy.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
Economics, Organization and Management.
Bhattacharya, S., Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2328903 · Cited by 4,644
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms
McCubbins, M. D., & Schwartz, T. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110792 · Cited by 2,936
Legislative leviathan: party government in the House
(1993) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.31-0579 · Cited by 2,313
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control
(1987) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036930 · Cited by 2,224
Information and Legislative Organization
Krehbiel, K. (1991) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.8850 · Cited by 1,718
McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R. G., & Weingast, B. R. (1989) · Virginia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1073179 · Cited by 1,207
Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
Romer, T., & Rosenthal, H. (1978) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf03187594 · Cited by 1,160
(1987) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036932 · Cited by 638
Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures
Bawn, K. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2083075 · Cited by 546
Cited by
Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-6536 · Cited by 910
The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU
Pollack, M. A. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0199251177.001.0001 · Cited by 888
Mapping the Ideological Marketplace
Bonica, A. (2014) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12062 · Cited by 680
Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise
Gailmard, S., & Patty, J. W. (2007) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00286.x · Cited by 496
Pathologies of accountability: ICANN and the challenge of “multiple accountabilities disorder”
Koppell, J. G. (2005) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2005.00434.x · Cited by 495
Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform
HUBER, J. D., & McCARTY, N. (2004) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055404001297 · Cited by 352
Yackee, S. W. (2006) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/mui042 · Cited by 309
Predicting Public Sector Accountability: From Agency Drift to Forum Drift
Schillemans, T., & Busuioc, M. (2015) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muu024 · Cited by 290
Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy
Huber, J. D., Shipan, C. R., & Pfahler, M. (2001) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669344 · Cited by 285
Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy
Balla, S. J. (1998) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585488 · Cited by 281
Bureaucracy and Democracy: The Case for More Bureaucracy and Less Democracy
Meier, K. J. (1997) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.2307/976648 · Cited by 177
Artificial intelligence and administrative evil
Young, M. M., Himmelreich, J., Bullock, J. B., & Kim, K.-C. (2021) · Perspectives on Public Management and Governance · doi:10.1093/ppmgov/gvab006 · Cited by 76
Sasso, G., & Morelli, M. (2021) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104497 · Cited by 43
How Personalist Parties Undermine State Capacity in Democracies
Li, J., & Wright, J. (2023) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/00104140231169014 · Cited by 15
A political-economic model of police administration
Clark, T. S. (2024) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/729933 · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Authors
- Epstein, D., & O'Halloran, S.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1994-08
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 697
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2328190647
- Cited by
- 447
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 16.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.