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Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting.
Abstract
Anyone who has wondered if free will is just an illusion or has asked 'could I have chosen otherwise?' after performing some rash deed will find this book an absorbing discussion of an endlessly fascinating subject. Daniel Dennett, whose previous books include Brainstorms and (with Douglas Hofstadter) The Mind's I, tackles the free will problem in a highly original and witty manner, drawing on the theories and concepts of several fields usually ignored by philosophers; not just physics and evolutionary biology, but engineering, automata theory, and artificial intelligence. In Elbow Room, Dennett shows how the classical formulations of the problem in philosophy depend on misuses of imagination, and he disentangles the philosophical problems of real interest from the family of anxieties' they get enmeshed in - imaginary agents, bogeymen, and dire prospects that seem to threaten our freedom. Putting sociobiology in its rightful place, he concludes that we have free will and science too. Elbow Room begins by showing how we be moved by reasons without being exempt from physical causation. It goes on to analyze concepts of control and self-control-concepts often skimped by philosophers but which are central to the questions of free will and determinism. A chapter on self-made selves discusses the idea of self or agent to see how it be kept from disappearing under the onslaught of science. Dennett then sees what be made of the notion of acting under the idea of freedomdoes the elbow room we think we have really exist? What is an opportunity, and how anything in our futures be to us? He investigates the meaning of can and could have done otherwise, and asks why we want free will in the first place.We are wise, Dennett notes, to want free will, but that in itself raises a host of questions about responsibility. In a final chapter, he takes up the problem of how anyone ever be guilty, and what the rationale is for holding people responsible and even, on occasion, punishing them. Elbow Room is an expanded version of the John Locke Lectures which Dennett gave at Oxford University in 1983.
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Greenspan, P. S., & Dennett, D. C.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1986-04
- Volume
- 95
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 257
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3185446826
- Cited by
- 293
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 0.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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