The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How to be a Fallibilist
Abstract
The acceptance of fallibilism in epistemology is virtually universal. Any theory of knowledge that endorses the principle that S knows q on the basis of reason r only if r entails q, is doomed to a skeptical conclusion. Fallibilist theories reject this entailment principle thereby avoiding this immediate skeptical result. The acceptance of fallibilism derives from the widely held view that what we seek in constructing a theory of knowledge is an account that squares with our strong intuition that we know many things. Of course, few believe that skepticism is to be avoided at all costs. But while the entailment principle may look attractive in the abstract, it does not command the kind of assent sufficient to withstand the overwhelming case against it provided by our everyday intuitions concerning what we know. Any residual worry associated with denying the principle is far outweighed by our common sense rejection of its skeptical consequences. Thus, a fallibilist theory allows that S can know q on the basis of r where r only makes q probable. Unfortunately, skepticism is not so easily dispatched. Other principles that look very difficult to reject threaten to reinstate skepticism-principles that lead to skeptical paradoxes for fallibilist theories. Thus, even fallibilist theories of knowledge are forced to confront skepticism, albeit in the form of a stubborn paradox rather than as a seemingly inescapable result. The theory of relevant alternatives can be viewed as providing fallibilist theories with a way out of skeptical paradoxes.' However, while the theory looks promising in its broad outline, many believe
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cohen, S.
- Venue
- Philosophical Perspectives
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1988
- Volume
- 2
- Pages
- 91
- ISSN
- 1520-8583 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2049957691
- Cited by
- 617
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 7.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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