The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
Abstract
Partha Dasgupta, Peter Hammond, Eric Maskin; The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility, The Review of Econ
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Citations
Cites
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Collective Choice and Social Welfare
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Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model
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Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
Myerson, R. B. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912346 · Cited by 1,983
Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
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Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
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Incentives and incomplete information
d'Aspremont, C., & Gérard-Varet, L.-A. (1979) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(79)90043-4 · Cited by 795
Halmos, P. R. (1960) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 628
Optimality and informational efficiency in resource allocation processes
Hurwicz, L. (1977) · Studies in Resource Allocation Processes · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511752940.014 · Cited by 410
Groves, T., & Loeb, M. (1975) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(75)90001-8 · Cited by 325
Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
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On Coalition Incentive Compatibility
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A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
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Cited by
Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
Baron, D. P., & Myerson, R. B. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912769 · Cited by 1,721
Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
Klemperer, P. (1999) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00083 · Cited by 1,394
Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
Maskin, E. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00076 · Cited by 1,180
Self-citationA Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and Distribution Services for New Issues
BARON, D. P. (1982) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03591.x · Cited by 929
Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems
Myerson, R. B. (1982) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4 · Cited by 912
Metadata
- Authors
- Dasgupta, P., Hammond, P., & Maskin, E.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1979-04
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 185
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2153335615
- Cited by
- 809
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 38.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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