The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
Abstract
Partha Dasgupta, Peter Hammond, Eric Maskin; The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility, The Review of Econ
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Dasgupta, P., Hammond, P., & Maskin, E.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1979-04
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 185
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2153335615
- Cited by
- 809
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 38.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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