The DOI matches its Crossref record; 257 of the 257 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Open accessAbstract
This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world.
Overview
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Claims the paper makes
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Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Finally, disclosure regulation can mitigate dead-weight losses to the economy.”
From Mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting: economic analysis and literature review (2021) · cites this paper as Shleifer and Vishny 1997
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“In large corporations of most countries, the fundamental agency problem is not the Berle and Means conflict between outside investors and managers, but rather that between outside investors and controlling shareholders, who in particular have nearly full control over the managers (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).”
From Investor protection and corporate governance (2000) · cites this paper as Shleifer and Vishny 1997
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe check wasn’t confident either way, so it gives no verdict — never disputed.
In the citing paper
“market size alone is not necessarily meaningful, as a small ISP may operate important infrastructure that allows it to control the traffic routed by other ISPs. 94”
From Authoritarian collaboration and repression in the digital age: balancing foreign direct investment and control in internet infrastructure (2026) · cites this paper as [94]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Self-check
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Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Coase, R. H. (1937) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x · Cited by 23,972
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,914
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(84)90023-0 · Cited by 18,957
An Economic Theory of Democracy.
Banfield, E. C., & Downs, A. J. (1958) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2109186 · Cited by 18,558
Coase, R. H. (1960) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466560 · Cited by 18,255
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1986) · Cited by 17,275
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism
Dugger, W. M. (1987) · Journal of Economic Issues · doi:10.1080/00213624.1987.11504638 · Cited by 14,873
The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment
Miller, M. H. (1958) · American Economic Review · Cited by 14,574
Determinants of corporate borrowing
Myers, S. C. (1977) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(77)90015-0 · Cited by 13,169
Research works printed but not linked: 6
- Blasi Joseph, 1996, Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia: Vol. 2 Insiders and the State
- Boycko Maxim, 1995, Privatizing Russia
- Holmstrom Bengt, 1982, Essays in Economics and Management in Honor of Lars Wahlbeck, 210
- Laffont Jean Jacques, 1993, A Theory of Incentives in Regulation and Procurement
- Shleifer Andrei, 1988, Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequence, 65
- Tunc Andre, 1991, European Business Law: Legal and Economic Analysis of Integration and Harmonization
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Investor protection and corporate governance
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9 · Cited by 6,848
Self-citationCorporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
STRATEGY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES.
Hoskisson, R. E., Eden, L., Lau, C. M., & Wright, M. (2000) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/1556394 · Cited by 3,835
Chapter 12 Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence
Levine, R. (2005) · Handbook of Economic Growth · doi:10.1016/s1574-0684(05)01012-9 · Cited by 2,889
Mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting: economic analysis and literature review
Christensen, H. B., Hail, L., & Leuz, C. (2021) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-021-09609-5 · Cited by 1,923
Metadata
- Authors
- Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- ORCID
- Vishny, Robert W.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1997-06
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 737-783
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W3121693921
- Cited by
- 16,243
- References
- 257
- Citations by year
- 2026: 516 · 2025: 675 · 2024: 644 · 2023: 744 · 2022: 695 · 2021: 767 · 2020: 841 · 2019: 792 · 2018: 726 · 2017: 701 · 2016: 762 · 2015: 800 · 2014: 838 · 2013: 784 · 2012: 802
- FWCI
- 702.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- The Journal of Finance (publishedVersion)
- Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Law
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Financial Management
- Keywords
- corporate governance, investor protection, ownership concentration, ownership structure, governance systems
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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- The paper
- Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governance. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x
