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A Survey of Corporate Governance
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This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world.
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“Finally, disclosure regulation can mitigate dead-weight losses to the economy.”
From Mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting: economic analysis and literature review (2021) · cites this paper as Shleifer and Vishny 1997
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“In large corporations of most countries, the fundamental agency problem is not the Berle and Means conflict between outside investors and managers, but rather that between outside investors and controlling shareholders, who in particular have nearly full control over the managers (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).”
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“market size alone is not necessarily meaningful, as a small ISP may operate important infrastructure that allows it to control the traffic routed by other ISPs. 94”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- ORCID
- Vishny, Robert W.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1997-06
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 737-783
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W3121693921
- Cited by
- 16,243
- References
- 257
- Citations by year
- 2026: 516 · 2025: 675 · 2024: 644 · 2023: 744 · 2022: 695 · 2021: 767 · 2020: 841 · 2019: 792 · 2018: 726 · 2017: 701 · 2016: 762 · 2015: 800 · 2014: 838 · 2013: 784 · 2012: 802
- FWCI
- 702.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- The Journal of Finance (publishedVersion)
- Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Law
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Financial Management
- Keywords
- corporate governance, investor protection, ownership concentration, ownership structure, governance systems
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