The DOI matches its Crossref record; 56 of the 56 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives
Abstract
Oliver E. Williamson University of California, Berkeley This paper combines institutional economics with aspects of contract law and organization theory to identify and explicate the key differences that distinguish three generic forms of economic organization-market, hybrid, and hierarchy. The analysis shows that the three generic forms are distinguished by different coordinating and control mechanisms and by different abilities to adapt to disturbances. Also, each generic form is supported and defined by a distinctive type of contract law. The costeffective choice of organization form is shown to vary systematically with the attributes of transactions. The paper unifies two hitherto disjunct areas of institutional economics-the institutional environment and the institutions of governance-by treating the institutional environment as a locus of parameters, changes in which parameters bring about shifts in the comparative costs of governance. Changes in property rights, contract law, reputation effects, and uncertainty are investigated.'
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“The TCE approach (Williamson, 1979(Williamson, , 1991) ) and the social embeddedness perspective (Granovetter, 1985) have had a central role in framing most definitions of cooperation that focus on attitude.”
From Collaboration, Coordination, and Cooperation Among Organizations: Establishing the Distinctive Meanings of These Terms Through a Systematic Literature Review (2020) · cites this paper as Williamson, 1991
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Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
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Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness
Granovetter, M. (1985) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/228311 · Cited by 28,745
Coase, R. H. (1937) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x · Cited by 23,972
Riggins, F. J., & Mitra, S. (1990) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.27-6637 · Cited by 16,590
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism
Dugger, W. M. (1987) · Journal of Economic Issues · doi:10.1080/00213624.1987.11504638 · Cited by 14,873
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Fama, E. F. (1980) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260866 · Cited by 10,543
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations
Williamson, O. E. (1979) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466942 · Cited by 10,190
Self-citationProduction, Information Costs and Economic Organization
Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1996) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198774358.003.0005 · Cited by 9,528
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261404 · Cited by 9,309
Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy
Reid, L. A., & Polanyi, M. (1959) · British Journal of Educational Studies · doi:10.2307/3119338 · Cited by 7,880
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Transaction Costs and Outsourcing Decisions in Small- and Medium-Sized Family Firms
Memili, E., Chrisman, J. J., & Chua, J. H. (2011) · Family Business Review · doi:10.1177/0894486510396706 · Cited by 51
Papaioannou, G., Mohammed, A.-M., Despoudi, S., Saridakis, G., & Papadopoulos, T. (2020) · International Journal of Information Management · doi:10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2020.102077 · Cited by 38
Choice of supply chain governance: Self-managing or outsourcing?
Lu, Q., Meng, F., & Goh, M. (2014) · International Journal of Production Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2014.03.022 · Cited by 34
Fuller, T., & Lewis, J. (2002) · British Journal of Management · doi:10.1111/1467-8551.00249 · Cited by 80
Baum (2000) · doi:10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(200003)21:3
Dynamic capabilities and strategic management
Teece, D. J., Pisano, G., & Shuen, A. (1997) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(199708)18:7
Metadata
- Authors
- Williamson, O. E.
- Corresponding author
- Williamson, Oliver E.
- Venue
- Administrative Science Quarterly
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1991-06
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 269
- ISSN
- 0001-8392 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2109280325
- Cited by
- 7,151
- References
- 56
- Citations by year
- 2026: 138 · 2025: 111 · 2024: 175 · 2023: 218 · 2022: 224 · 2021: 299 · 2020: 253 · 2019: 262 · 2018: 271 · 2017: 275 · 2016: 238 · 2015: 293 · 2014: 312 · 2013: 351 · 2012: 356
- FWCI
- 99.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Administrative Science Quarterly (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management Information Systems › Outsourcing and Supply Chain Management
- Keywords
- market organization, hybrid organizations, hierarchy, coordination mechanisms, control mechanisms, organizational adaptation, contract law, property rights, reputation effects, uncertainty, transaction costs, governance costs, institutional environment, organizational form choice
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