The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency
Abstract
This article analyzes a model in which information about a worker's ability is only directly revealed to the firm employing the worker; other firms, however, use the worker's job assignment as a signal of ability. Three results recur throughout the analysis. First, wage rates tend to be more closely associated with jobs than with ability levels. Second, there is frequently an inefficient assignment of workers to jobs (i.e., even when a firm has complete information about a worker's output). Third, the severity of this inefficiency tends to be negatively correlated with the level of firm-specific human capital in the economy.
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Citations
Cites
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Working-Class Power, Capitalist-Class Interests, and Class Compromise
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Self-citationChapter 2 The theory of the firm
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Metadata
- Authors
- Waldman, M.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1984
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 255
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1966338782
- Cited by
- 518
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 6.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.