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Greenmail, White Knights, and Shareholders' Interest
Abstract
This article develops a model in which greenmail and other forms of management resistance to takeovers can benefit shareholders. In particular, discouraging some potential acquirers may increase shareholder wealth because it encourages others to pursue a combination with the target. This occurs because the number of competing acquirers is reduced and because resistance can signal that the target does not have access to a "white knight." This signalling effect may explain why share prices decline after management resists a takeover, even when such resistance is value-maximizing in the long run.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citationTakeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation
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Cited by
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Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
“He also has enough voting control to put pressure on the management in some cases, or perhaps even to oust the management through a proxy fight or a takeover (Shleifer and Vishny (1986b)).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1986
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 293
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1981152081
- Cited by
- 159
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 23.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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