The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
DISAGGREGATING THE AGENCY CONTRACT: THE EFFECTS OF MONITORING, INCENTIVE ALIGNMENT, AND TERM IN OFFICE ON AGENT DECISION MAKING.
Abstract
Using a laboratory design, we examined the simple and interactive effects of monitoring and incentive alignment on managerial decisions. Length of term in office was a third independent variable. R...
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Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1989.4279003 · Cited by 13,338
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Fama, E. F. (1980) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260866 · Cited by 10,466
Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization
Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1996) · Firms, Organizations and Contracts · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198774358.003.0005 · Cited by 9,565
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261677 · Cited by 5,083
Agency Problems and Residual Claims
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467038 · Cited by 4,827
Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns
Donaldson, L., & Davis, J. H. (1991) · Australian Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/031289629101600103 · Cited by 3,552
Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers
Amihud, Y., & Lev, B. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003575 · Cited by 2,772
Cited by
THE ROLE OF FAMILY TIES IN AGENCY CONTRACTS.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Nunez-Nickel, M., & Gutierrez, I. (2001) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/3069338 · Cited by 1,305
Self-citationCao, Z., & Lumineau, F. (2015) · Journal of Operations Management · doi:10.1016/j.jom.2014.09.009 · Cited by 937
Substitutes or Complements? A Configurational Examination of Corporate Governance Mechanisms
Misangyi, V. F., & Acharya, A. G. (2014) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2012.0728 · Cited by 771
BOARD CONTROL, REMUNERATION COMMITTEES, AND TOP MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION.
Conyon, M. J., & Peck, S. I. (1998) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/257099 · Cited by 734
Organizational Design and Environmental Performance: Clues From the Electronics Industry
Russo, M. V., & Harrison, N. S. (2005) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2005.17843939 · Cited by 398
Metadata
- Authors
- TOSI, H. L., KATZ, J. P., & GOMEZ-MEJIA, L. R.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 1997-06-01
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 584-602
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W1979682775
- Cited by
- 347
- References
- 40
- FWCI
- 14.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: DISAGGREGATING THE AGENCY CONTRACT: THE EFFECTS OF MONITORING, INCENTIVE ALIGNMENT, AND TERM IN OFFICE ON AGENT DECISION MAKING. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/257054
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- TOSI, H. L., KATZ, J. P., & GOMEZ-MEJIA, L. R. (1997). DISAGGREGATING THE AGENCY CONTRACT: THE EFFECTS OF MONITORING, INCENTIVE ALIGNMENT, AND TERM IN OFFICE ON AGENT DECISION MAKING. Academy of Management Journal. https://doi.org/10.2307/257054
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.