The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage
Abstract
that, under some fairly weak assumptions, for all levels of the valence advantage, the advantaged candidate chooses a more moderate position than the disadvantaged candidate. Empirical studies of congressional elections by Fiorina (1973), and Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2001) support this result. D~ owns' (1957) seminal work presents a puzzle for scholars of U.S. elections: Why do candidates not converge to the median voter? One of the best explanations is that the candidates themselves have ideological preferences. As Calvert (1985) and Wittman (1977, 1983) have shown, when candidates have such preferences and they are sufficiently uncertain about the preferences of the median voter, then they do not converge, although they may moderate their positions from their ideal point. The basic version of the Calvert-Wittman model, however, does not account for another basic fact of U.S. elections: often one of the candidates has an advantage due to a nonpolicy factor, such as incumbency, greater campaign funds, better name recognition, superior charisma, superior intelligence, and so on. Stokes has dubbed such factors valence factors, and he has noted their importance in U.S. elections (Stokes 1963;1992).1 In this article I extend the basic Calvert-Wittman model by giving one candidate a valence advantage over the other. I show that if the valence characteristics of the candidates are approximately equal, then when a candidate's valence advantage increases, this causes her to move toward the
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
An Economic Theory of Democracy.
Banfield, E. C., & Downs, A. (1958) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2109186 · Cited by 18,594
Hotelling, H. (1990) · The Collected Economics Articles of Harold Hotelling · doi:10.1007/978-1-4613-8905-7_4 · Cited by 5,677
The Theory of Committees and Elections.
Stuart, A., & Black, D. (1959) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2550498 · Cited by 2,822
Katz, R. S. (1982) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1961197 · Cited by 2,468
Spatial Models of Party Competition
Stokes, D. E. (1963) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1952828 · Cited by 1,964
Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large
Kimball, M. S. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938334 · Cited by 1,788
Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
Rogoff, K., & Sibert, A. (1988) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297526 · Cited by 1,607
The Effect of Uncertainty on Saving Decisions
Sandmo, A. (1970) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296725 · Cited by 918
Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories
Wittman, D. (1983) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956016 · Cited by 844
Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence
Calvert, R. L. (1985) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111212 · Cited by 825
Cited by
Polarized America: the dance of ideology and unequal riches
(2007) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.44-3551 · Cited by 1,795
A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics
Bawn, K., Cohen, M., Karol, D., Masket, S., Noel, H., & Zaller, J. (2012) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592712001624 · Cited by 859
Adams, J., Clark, M., Ezrow, L., & Glasgow, G. (2006) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00199.x · Cited by 709
How Ideology Fuels Affective Polarization
Rogowski, J. C., & Sutherland, J. L. (2016) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-015-9323-7 · Cited by 503
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-3522 · Cited by 487
Why dominant parties lose: Mexico's democratization in comparative perspective
(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.45-6403 · Cited by 479
A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers
Diermeier, D., Keane, M., & Merlo, A. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828053828464 · Cited by 452
Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States
MILLER, G., & SCHOFIELD, N. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000650 · Cited by 398
DOWNS AND TWO-PARTY CONVERGENCE
Grofman, B. (2004) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104711 · Cited by 385
GALASSO, V., & NANNICINI, T. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000535 · Cited by 367
Adams, J. (2012) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-031710-101450 · Cited by 315
Timely Decisions: The Effects of Past National Elections on Party Policy Change
Somer-Topcu, Z. (2009) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381608090154 · Cited by 294
When Voters and Parties Agree: Valence Issues and Party Competition
Green, J. (2007) · Political Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00671.x · Cited by 290
(2016) · Cited by 286
Spatial Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election
JESSEE, S. A. (2009) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s000305540909008x · Cited by 285
Candidate Valence and Ideological Positions in U.S. House Elections
Stone, W. J., & Simas, E. N. (2010) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00436.x · Cited by 281
Principle vs. Pragmatism: Policy Shifts and Political Competition
Tavits, M. (2007) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00243.x · Cited by 271
Electoral Competition and Democratic Responsiveness: A Defense of the Marginality Hypothesis
Griffin, J. D. (2006) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00479.x · Cited by 267
Justice and Democracy: Essays for Brian Barry
(2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511490217 · Cited by 256
Signaling Character in Electoral Competition
Kartik, N., & McAfee, R. P. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.3.852 · Cited by 252
Metadata
- Authors
- Groseclose, T.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2001-10
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 862
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2135804127
- Cited by
- 754
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 77.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.