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Managerial Ownership, Incentive Contracting, and the Use of Zero-Cost Collars and Equity Swaps by Corporate Insiders
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J. Carr Bettis, John M. Bizjak, Michael L. Lemmon, Managerial Ownership, Incentive Contracting, and the Use of Zero-Cost Collars and Equity Swaps by Corporate Insiders, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sep., 2001), pp. 345-370
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bettis, J. C., Bizjak, J. M., & Lemmon, M. L.
- Venue
- The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2001-09
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 345
- ISSN
- 0022-1090 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2122598534
- Cited by
- 202
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 35.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.