The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Freedom in Belief and Desire
Abstract
People ordinarily suppose that there are certain things they ought to believe and certain things they ought not to believe. In supposing this to be so, they make corresponding assumptions about their belief-forming capacities. They assume that they are generally responsive to what they think they ought to believe in the things they actually come to believe. In much the same sense, people ordinarily suppose that there are certain things they ought to desire and do and they make corresponding assumptions about their capacities to form desires and act on them. We chart these assumptions in this paper and argue that they entail that people are responsible and free on two fronts. They are free and responsible believers, and free and responsible desirers.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citationWolf, S. (2005) · Personal Autonomy · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511614194.012 · Cited by 834
Deciding to trust, coming to believe
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Self-citationReduction, explanation, and realism
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Self-citationStrategies for free will compatibilists
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Cited by
On the people's terms: a republican theory and model of democracy
(2013) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.51-1150 · Cited by 748
Cudd, A. E. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195187431.001.0001 · Cited by 483
Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays
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The Oxford Handbook of Free Will
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Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion
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Metadata
- Authors
- Pettit, P., Smith, M., & Journal of Philosophy Inc.
- Venue
- Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 1996
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- 429-449
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1567388400
- Cited by
- 306
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 11.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- de
- Open access
- closed
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