The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter
Abstract
The European Parliament under the current cooperation procedure has an important power: it can make proposals that, if accepted by the Commission of the European Communities, are easier for the Council of Ministers to accept than to modify, since only qualified majority is required for acceptance, whereas full unanimity for modification. The importance of this power, which I call the power of the conditional agenda setter, has not been recognized in previous scholarly work. For structural reasons explained in the text, this power is likely to increase in the future. I conclude by arguing that the conditional delegation of power to international actors (the European Parliament, Commission, and the Court of Justice) is a frequent phenomenon in European institutions. This delegation presents three important advantages: it makes possible the selection of one among many possible equilibria, it accelerates European integration, and it diffuses responsibility for politically unpopular measures.
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Citations
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Self-citation
Cited by
Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms
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Self-citationPreferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach
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Self-citationThe Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis
PIERSON, P. (1996) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414096029002001 · Cited by 1,634
Metadata
- Authors
- Tsebelis, G.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1994-03
- Volume
- 88
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 128-142
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2101586208
- Cited by
- 776
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 156.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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