The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
Open accessAbstract
The authors study repeated games in which players observe a public outcome that imperfectly signals the actions played. They provide conditions guaranteeing that any feasible, individually rational payoff vector of the stage game can arise as a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game with sufficiently little discounting. The central condition requires that there exist action profiles with the property that, for any two players, no two deviations--one by either player--give rise to the same probability distribution over public outcomes. The results apply to principal-agent, partnership, oligopoly, and mechanism-design models, and to one-shot games with transferable utilities. Copyright 1994 by The Econometric Society.
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Citations
Cites
Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
Green, E. J., & Porter, R. H. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911462 · Cited by 1,998
On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
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On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
Abreu, D. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911077 · Cited by 1,252
Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
Abreu, D., Pearce, D., & Stacchetti, E. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938299 · Cited by 1,203
Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
Rubinstein, A. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90002-4 · Cited by 456
Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
Radner, R. (1981) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912747 · Cited by 405
Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
Radner, R. (1985) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911017 · Cited by 382
Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
Abreu, D., Milgrom, P., & Pearce, D. (1991) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938286 · Cited by 315
Optimal cartel trigger price strategies
Porter, R. H. (1983) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90050-9 · Cited by 282
Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
Rubinstein, A., & Yaari, M. E. (1983) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90094-7 · Cited by 265
Long-Term Competition—A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Aumann, R. J., & Shapley, L. S. (1994) · Essays in Game Theory · doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_1 · Cited by 187
An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
Radner, R., Myerson, R., & Maskin, E. (1986) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297591 · Cited by 167
Self-citationRepeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
Drew Fudenberg, B., Kreps, D. M., & Maskin, E. S. (1990) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2298086 · Cited by 155
Self-citationAsset trading mechanisms and expansionary policy
Levine, D. K. (1991) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(91)90110-p · Cited by 151
Self-citationOn Repeated Games with Complete Information
Sorin, S. (1986) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.11.1.147 · Cited by 127
The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete InformationPreprint
Drew Fudenberg, B., & Maskin, E. S. (1998) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 115
Self-citationEfficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
Matsushima, H. (1989) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(89)90036-7 · Cited by 25
Cited by
Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
Abreu, D., Pearce, D., & Stacchetti, E. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938299 · Cited by 1,203
Relational Incentive Contracts
Levin, J. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322157115 · Cited by 1,099
A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
SANNIKOV, Y. (2008) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00486.x · Cited by 716
Reciprocity: Weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate
Guala, F. (2012) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x11000069 · Cited by 522
Cognitive systems for revenge and forgiveness
McCullough, M. E., Kurzban, R., & Tabak, B. A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x11002160 · Cited by 481
Metadata
- Authors
- Fudenberg, D., Levine, D., & Maskin, E.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1994-09
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 997
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2156763099
- Cited by
- 767
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 7.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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