The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
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Citations
Cites
Reputation and imperfect information
Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8 · Cited by 3,087
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911307 · Cited by 2,395
A Course in Microeconomic Theory
Kreps, D. M. (2020) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.23943/princeton/9780691202754.001.0001 · Cited by 1,592
Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory
(1991) · Papers in Experimental Economics · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528354.008 · Cited by 1,123
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
Harsanyi, J. C. (1968) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.14.5.320 · Cited by 988
Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
Rosenthal, R. W. (1981) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(81)90018-1 · Cited by 755
Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model
Camerer, C., & Weigelt, K. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911840 · Cited by 572
A Course in Microeconomic Theory.
Bray, M., & Kreps, D. M. (1991) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2233572 · Cited by 393
End behavior in sequences of finite prisoner's dilemma supergames
Selten, R., & Stoecker, R. (1983) · Cited by 169
Private incentives in social dilemmas
Palfrey, T. R., & Rosenthal, H. L. (1988) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(88)90035-7 · Cited by 134
Self-citationThe Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete InformationPreprint
Drew Fudenberg, B., & Maskin, E. S. (1998) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 115
The Sequential Equilibrium Theory of Reputation Building: A Further Test
Neral, J., & Ochs, J. (1992) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951542 · Cited by 89
Cited by
ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.166 · Cited by 5,378
Остром, Э. (2010) · Public Administration Issues · doi:10.17323/1999-5431-2010-0-1-5-52 · Cited by 2,850
Falk, A., & Fischbacher, U. (2006) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.001 · Cited by 2,416
A theory of sequential reciprocity
Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2004) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.003 · Cited by 1,867
The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework
Camerer, C. F., Hogarth, R. M., Budescu, D. V., & Eckel, C. (1999) · Elicitation of Preferences · doi:10.1007/978-94-017-1406-8_2 · Cited by 1,545
Metadata
- Authors
- McKelvey, R. D., & Palfrey, T. R.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1992-07
- Volume
- 60
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 803
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2172873870
- Cited by
- 740
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 46.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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