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An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
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Metadata
- Authors
- McKelvey, R. D., & Palfrey, T. R.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1992-07
- Volume
- 60
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 803
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2172873870
- Cited by
- 740
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 46.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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