The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition
Abstract
The paper shows that an increase in competition has two effects on managerial incentives: It increases the probability of liquidation, which has a positive effect on managerial effort, but it also reduces the firm's profits, which may make it less attractive to induce high effort. Thus, the total effect is ambiguous. I identify natural circumstances where increasing competition unambiguously reduces managerial slack. In general, however, this relation need not be monotonic. A simple example demonstrates that—starting from a monopoly—managerial effort may increase as additional competitors enter the market, but will eventually decrease when competition becomes too intense.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Measuring and Explaining Management Practices Across Firms and Countries
Bloom, N., & Van Reenen, J. (2007) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2007.122.4.1351 · Cited by 2,373
Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship
Aghion, P., Bloom, N., Blundell, R. W., Griffith, R., & Howitt, P. (2004) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1306944 · Cited by 2,117
Competition and innovation: an inverted U relationship
Blundell, R., Howitt, P., Griffith, R., Aghion, P., & Bloom, N. (2002) · Working Paper Series · doi:10.1920/wp.ifs.2002.0204 · Cited by 2,109
Innovation and Institutional Ownership
Aghion, P., Van Reenen, J., & Zingales, L. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.1.277 · Cited by 1,938
Trade Induced Technical Change? The Impact of Chinese Imports on Innovation, IT and Productivity
Bloom, N., Draca, M., & Van Reenen, J. (2016) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdv039 · Cited by 1,521
Metadata
- Authors
- Schmidt, K. M.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1997-04
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 191
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2110821787
- Cited by
- 1,177
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 75.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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