The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 9 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.
Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem
Abstract
In his very influential book, The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers argues that if physicalism is true then every positive truth is a priori entailed by the full physical description – this is called “the a priori entailment thesis – but ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness are not so entailed and he concludes that Physicalism is false. As he puts it, “zombies” are metaphysically possible. I show that his argument can be refuted by considering an analogous argument in the mouth of a zombie. The conclusion of this argument is false so one of the premises is false. I argue at length that this shows that the original conceivability argument also has a false premise and so is unsound.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
Balog argues that Jackson’s and Chalmers’s Conceivability Arguments against physicalism fail because the A Priori Entailment Thesis linking conceivability to metaphysical possibility is false. She uses a “Zombie Refutation” and analogues to show the problem lies in the nature of phenomenal concepts, not in phenomenal consciousness itself.
Key findings
- Balog grants that zombies are conceivable but denies that this establishes their metaphysical possibility; the Conceivability Arguments rely on the A Priori Entailment Thesis, which she argues is mistaken.
- The Zombie Refutation shows that if zombie-Jackson’s word-for-word argument is meaningful and valid, its premises parallel Jackson’s, yet its dualist conclusion is false in the stipulated physicalistic zombie-world; therefore one premise must be false, and the obvious candidate is the A Priori Entailment Thesis.
- The Yogi Refutation constructs a concept that directly refers to a physical brain state without being a priori derivable from the full physical description, showing that the conceivability of zombies arises from a peculiarity of phenomenal concepts rather than from nonphysical consciousness.
- Balog concludes that the Conceivability Arguments do not refute physicalism; physicalists can accept an explanatory gap and the conceivability of zombies, while dualism remains implausible because of problems such as epiphenomenalism and causal closure.
Methods
- Philosophical argument and reductio, not empirical research; no data or sample are used.
- The paper analyzes Jackson’s and Chalmers’s formulations of physicalism, including the minimal physical duplicate definition and the principle (E) that for any true statement T, K ⊃ T, then attacks the A Priori Entailment Thesis.
- It constructs the Zombie Refutation, plus partial-zombie and Yogi analogues, and defends auxiliary assumptions about zombie intentional states, reference of phenomenal⁺ terms, and a prioricity supervening on conceptual role.
Limitations
- The paper states that it grants zombies are conceivable and does not rely on the private language argument or analytic functionalism/behaviorism about qualia; it aims to show the Conceivability Arguments fail, not to establish physicalism.
- The paper says it does not fully treat how exceptions to the A Priori Entailment Thesis should be handled, and it sets aside full treatment of Jackson’s semantics and some objections.
- Evident from the text: the argument depends on contested auxiliary assumptions—that zombies have intentional states, that zombie phenomenal⁺ terms refer to physical states, and that a prioricity supervenes on conceptual role—which Balog defends but acknowledges as objectionable.
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In the paper
“While their arguments are my particular focus, my criticisms extend to the other Conceivability Arguments as well, since I will be attacking the link between conceivability and metaphysical possibility that they all presuppose.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“I think that it can be explained by the intuitive pull of the Transparency Thesis, roughly, the thesis that if we have two concepts, both of which refer via an essential reference fixer, then we must be able to tell whether they co-refer.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
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In the paper
“The only assumption needed to explain E is that metaphysical reductionism is true; that is, the only explanation needed is the assumption that there is some appropriate metaphysical relationship (identity, or the realization relation, or perhaps some other, yet unknown relationship) between the referents of higher-level and basic physical concepts.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
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In the paper
“However, my aim here is to consider the new Conceivability Arguments due to Frank Jackson and David Chalmers and show that the very principle connecting conceivability and possibility they rely on is mistaken.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
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In the paper
“But among its premises the only contentious one is the A Priori Entailment Thesis.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Citations
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Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation
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“31 Among type-B materialists, Balog 1999 and Loar 1997 (and possibly others) accept that psychophysical necessities may be sui generis in this way. Balog 1999 argues that reasoning from an epistemic gap to an ontological gap is invalid, since a zombie (a physical duplicate of a conscious being, without consciousness)…”
ResultPurple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness
Levine, J. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0195132351.001.0001 · Cited by 470
The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief
Chalmers, D. J. (2003) · Consciousness · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199241286.003.0009 · Cited by 383
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Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness
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“Balog (1999) has suggested that there must be something wrong with the argument, on the grounds that if zombies are possible, they could make a parallel argument to the conclusion that materialism is false in their world.”
BackgroundThere Are No Phenomenal Concepts
Ball, D. (2009) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzp134 · Cited by 147
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Acquaintance and the mind–body problem
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“In Balog (1999) I refuted the Zombie Argument by arguing that if it is sound then it follows – given a few plausible assumptions – that a zombie counterpart to this argument is also sound.”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology
Carruthers, P., & Veillet, B. (2011) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.003.0002 · Cited by 112
“(Perhaps they are indexical and/or recognitional concepts of a certain sort; see Loar 1990; Carruthers 2000; Perry 2001; or perhaps they actually contain, by quoting, the experiences that they are about; see Balog 1999; Papineau 2002.”
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Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap
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Where's the Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial
Schroer, R. (2009) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048400903143861 · Cited by 101
Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap
Chalmers, D. J. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0010 · Cited by 91
“Balog (1999) suggests that the zombie does assert a truth, as its term 'phenomenal consciousness' will refer to a brain state.”
BackgroundInfluentialBalog, K. (2009) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0018 · Cited by 95
Self-citationA Simple View of Consciousness
Pautz, A. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0002 · Cited by 94
Aydede, M., & Güzeldere, G. (2005) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.0029-4624.2005.00500.x · Cited by 80
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Carruthers, P., & Veillet, B. (2007) · Cited by 73
In Defense of Phenomenal Concepts
Veillet, B. (2012) · Philosophical Papers · doi:10.1080/05568641.2012.662808 · Cited by 55
Pitt, D. (2024) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198789901.001.0001 · Cited by 50
The Knowledge Argument Is an Argument about Knowledge
Crane, T. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.002 · Cited by 53
Kripke's Argument Against Materialism
Hirsch, E. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0005 · Cited by 48
From the Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance: Resurrecting the Mind
Robinson, H. M. (2016) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781316092873 · Cited by 100
The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism
Alter, T. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198840459.001.0001 · Cited by 40
God and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Novel Approach to Knowledge Arguments
Nagasawa, Y. (2008) · Cited by 37
Marcus, E. (2004) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/713659880 · Cited by 39
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McGeer, V. (2003) · Pacific philosophical quarterly · doi:10.1046/j.1468-0114.2003.00180.x · Cited by 31
“3 Among these discussions is a particularly interesting paper by Katalin Balog (Balog, 1999).”
BackgroundAn Argument from Transtemporal Identity for Subject–Body Dualism
Nida‐Rümelin, M. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0009 · Cited by 39
Consciousness and the Laws of Physics
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“This point has been made in different ways in the literature; see Balog (1999, 2012), Frankish (2007), Brown (2010), and Campbell et al. (2017).”
ResultThe cognitive significance of phenomenal knowledge
Veillet, B. (2015) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0451-z · Cited by 30
Reductive Explanation and the 'Explanatory Gap'
Carruthers, P. (2004) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00455091.2004.10716563 · Cited by 29
Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise
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Kind, A. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.009 · Cited by 33
Barnett, D. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0007 · Cited by 31
Sobre la conveniencia de incluir los neuroderechos en la Constitución o en la ley
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Acquaintance and Phenomenal Concepts
Pitt, D. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.005 · Cited by 28
Substance Dualism: A Non‐Cartesian Approach
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Acquaintance, Parsimony, and Epiphenomenalism
Gertler, B. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.004 · Cited by 27
Persons and the Unity of Consciousness
Hasker, W. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0008 · Cited by 28
Levine, J. (2008) · The Monist · doi:10.5840/monist20089122 · Cited by 23
“…philosophers who want to make phenomenal experience safe for materialism appeal to the special nature of these concepts in order to explain our strikingly resilient intuitive resistance to materialist accounts of the phenomenal (Balog 1999, Levine 2007, Loar 1997, Papineau 2002, and Perry 2001).”
BackgroundGrzankowski, A., & Tye, M. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198803461.003.0004 · Cited by 24
What explains the “hard” problem of consciousness?
Masciari, C. F., & Carruthers, P. (2020) · Cognitive Neuropsychology · doi:10.1080/02643294.2020.1729712 · Cited by 22
“Some have thought that they are a special class of recognitional concept (Carruthers, 2000; Loar, 1990), others that they involve a sort of mental quotation of one’s own experiences (Balog, 1999; Papineau, 2002).”
BackgroundBonJour, L. A. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0001 · Cited by 32
The Knowledge Argument Meets Representationalism about Colour Experience
Jackson, F. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.006 · Cited by 23
The Knowledge Argument and the Self
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The Knowledge Argument Is Either Indefensible or Redundant
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Grounding, Analysis, and Russellian Monism
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Type Materialism for Phenomenal Consciousness
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Concept Mastery, Social Externalism, and Mary’s New Knowledge
Alter, T. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.008 · Cited by 22
Introduction: The Enduring Significance of Jackson’s Knowledge Argument
Coleman, S. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.001 · Cited by 20
ROSENTHAL, D. M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.003 · Cited by 22
Churchland on Arguments Against Physicalism
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Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem
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“For further arguments in support of this claim, see Balog 1999.”
Quantum Mechanics and the Consciousness Constraint
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Zombies, Epiphenomenalism, and Physicalist Theories of Consciousness
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“29 Katalin Balog (1999) makes her objection to conceivability arguments turn on the claim that when a zombie says 'I am conscious' they are saying something that is not only meaningful but true.”
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How Physicalists Can—and Cannot—Explain the Seeming “Absurdity” of Physicalism
Sundström, P. (2017) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12394 · Cited by 14
Nonreductive Physicalism or Emergent Dualism? The Argument from Mental Causation
O'Connor, T., & Churchill, J. R. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0013 · Cited by 20
First-person experience cannot rescue causal structure theories from the unfolding argument
Herzog, M. H., Schurger, A., & Doerig, A. (2022) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2021.103261 · Cited by 14
“Our argument that IIT leads to epiphenomenalism is similar to the “ zombie argument for physicalism ” (Carroll, 2021; see also Balog, 1999; Brown, 2010; Frankish, 2007).”
Introduction: The Recent Renaissance of Acquaintance
Raleigh, T. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198803461.003.0001 · Cited by 14
“This kind of approach has been pursued by Papineau (1993, 2002, 2007), Balog (1999, 2012) and Melnyk (2002).”
BackgroundPhysicalism, Conceivability and Strong Necessities
Kallestrup, J. (2006) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-004-7325-9 · Cited by 13
“Second, if meaning is transparent, then arguably meaning shouldn’t be individuated modally in terms of functions from worlds to truth-values, but in a more fine-grained manner in terms of cognitive significance; see Loar (1997) and Balog (1999).”
BackgroundLightweight and heavyweight anti-physicalism
Aleksiev, D. (2022) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03506-3 · Cited by 11
“” 4 PCS physicalists include Loar (1990), Balog (1999), and Papineau (2002), among others.”
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Elpidorou, A. (2013) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-013-9455-0 · Cited by 8
“2 Proponents of PCS include: Balog (2012), Diaz-Leon (2008) and (2010), Hill (1997), Hill and McLaughlin (1999), Loar (1990), (1997) and (2003), Papineau (2002) and (2006), Perry (2001), Tye (1995) and (2000).”
The Cogito and the Metaphysics of Mind
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Epistemological Objections to Materialism
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Materialism, Minimal Emergentism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness
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What Mary’s Aboutness Is About
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Lee, A. Y. (2023) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.1111/phpe.12187 · Cited by 6
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“Some further moves in the debate include Balog 1999 , Block and Stalnaker 1999 , Bringsjord 1999 , Brueckner 2001 , Chalmers 1999 , Dennett 2001 , Dietrich and Gillies 2001 , Dretske 2003 , Frankish 2007 , Hawthorne 2001 , Kirk 1999 and 2005, Latham 2000 , Levin 2002 , Levine 1998 , Lynch 2004 ,…”
BackgroundMaterialism Does Not Save the Phenomena—and the Alternative Which Does
Meixner, U. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0021 · Cited by 9
Does Experience Have Phenomenal Properties?
Lee, G. (2016) · Philosophical Topics · doi:10.5840/philtopics201644223 · Cited by 4
“The fact that we are conscious and they aren’t puts us in a superior epistemic situation (although see Balog 1999 and Lee 2013 for some pushback against this).”
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Piccinini, G. (2015) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-015-9323-6 · Cited by 6
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Phenomenal KnowledgeWhy: The Explanatory Knowledge Argument against Physicalism
Mørch, H. H. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.012 · Cited by 7
Property Identities and Modal Arguments
Ball, D. (2011) · St Andrews Research Repository (St Andrews Research Repository) · Cited by 5
Conceivability and Coherence: A Skeptical View of Zombies
Geirsson, H. (2013) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9486-8 · Cited by 5
The Self‐Consciousness Argument: Functionalism and the Corruption of Content
Bealer, G. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0006 · Cited by 8
Shades of zero: Distinguishing impossibility from inconceivability
Hu, J., Sosa, F., & Ullman, T. D. (2025) · Journal of Memory and Language · doi:10.1016/j.jml.2025.104640 · Cited by 11
The Lazarus Crisis: Subjectivity, Language and Sacrifice in Cultural Narratives
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Phenomenal character, phenomenal concepts, and externalism
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Gasparri, L. (2021) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2021.1930579 · Cited by 3
“Some argue in favor (e.g. Levine 2001; Stoljar 2001), but there certainly is no shortage of philosophers arguing that conceivability is incapable of providing a dependable test for claims of metaphysical possibility (a.o., Yablo 1993; Hill 1997; Balog 1999; Frankish 2007).”
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Leftow, B. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0020 · Cited by 7
Kirk, R. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199285489.003.0005 · Cited by 3
Against Methodological Materialism
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Ontological novelty, emergence, and the mind-body problem
Balog, K. (2006) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 3
Self-citationEpistemological Physicalism and the Knowledge Argument
Kallestrup, J. (2006) · Cited by 2
Strawson, G. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316494134.007 · Cited by 4
The Epistemology of Psychedelic Experience
Lyons, J. (2024) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-65790-0_10 · Cited by 2
Conceivability and Epistemic Possibility
Fiocco, M. O. (2007) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-007-9057-y · Cited by 2
“21 For just a few examples in this growing literature, see Stalnaker (2002), Brueckner (2001), and Balog (1999).”
BackgroundDo Conceivability Arguments against Physicalism Beg the Question?
Levin, J. (2012) · Philosophical Topics · doi:10.5840/philtopics201240214 · Cited by 2
“See, for example, Balog (2012), Block and Stalnaker (1999), Hill (1991), Hill and McLaughlin (1997), Loar (1997), Papineau (2002), Perry (2001), and Tye (1995).”
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Alter, T. (2007) · Disputatio · doi:10.2478/disp-2007-0001 · Cited by 4
Stoljar, D. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195306589.003.0003 · Cited by 2
Kobes, B. W. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0010 · Cited by 3
La plausibilidad conceptual del dualismo mente-cuerpo. Una nueva defensa del argumento modal
Guirado, M. A. (2016) · Discusiones Filosóficas · doi:10.17151/difil.2016.17.28.7 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- Balog, K.
- Corresponding author
- Balog, Katalin
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1999-10
- Volume
- 108
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 497
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1989084433
- Cited by
- 242
- References
- 25
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 34 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 17.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Philosophical Review (publishedVersion)
- Rutgers University Community Repository (Rutgers University) (submittedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- conceivability argument, zombie argument, physicalism, phenomenal consciousness, David Chalmers, mind-body problem, conceivability, possibility
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-09-30, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-09-30 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.