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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 9 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem

Balog, Katalin · 1999 · The Philosophical Review

Abstract

In his very influential book, The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers argues that if physicalism is true then every positive truth is a priori entailed by the full physical description – this is called “the a priori entailment thesis – but ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness are not so entailed and he concludes that Physicalism is false. As he puts it, “zombies” are metaphysically possible. I show that his argument can be refuted by considering an analogous argument in the mouth of a zombie. The conclusion of this argument is false so one of the premises is false. I argue at length that this shows that the original conceivability argument also has a false premise and so is unsound.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

Balog argues that Jackson’s and Chalmers’s Conceivability Arguments against physicalism fail because the A Priori Entailment Thesis linking conceivability to metaphysical possibility is false. She uses a “Zombie Refutation” and analogues to show the problem lies in the nature of phenomenal concepts, not in phenomenal consciousness itself.

Key findings

  • Balog grants that zombies are conceivable but denies that this establishes their metaphysical possibility; the Conceivability Arguments rely on the A Priori Entailment Thesis, which she argues is mistaken.
  • The Zombie Refutation shows that if zombie-Jackson’s word-for-word argument is meaningful and valid, its premises parallel Jackson’s, yet its dualist conclusion is false in the stipulated physicalistic zombie-world; therefore one premise must be false, and the obvious candidate is the A Priori Entailment Thesis.
  • The Yogi Refutation constructs a concept that directly refers to a physical brain state without being a priori derivable from the full physical description, showing that the conceivability of zombies arises from a peculiarity of phenomenal concepts rather than from nonphysical consciousness.
  • Balog concludes that the Conceivability Arguments do not refute physicalism; physicalists can accept an explanatory gap and the conceivability of zombies, while dualism remains implausible because of problems such as epiphenomenalism and causal closure.

Methods

  • Philosophical argument and reductio, not empirical research; no data or sample are used.
  • The paper analyzes Jackson’s and Chalmers’s formulations of physicalism, including the minimal physical duplicate definition and the principle (E) that for any true statement T, K ⊃ T, then attacks the A Priori Entailment Thesis.
  • It constructs the Zombie Refutation, plus partial-zombie and Yogi analogues, and defends auxiliary assumptions about zombie intentional states, reference of phenomenal⁺ terms, and a prioricity supervening on conceptual role.

Limitations

  • The paper states that it grants zombies are conceivable and does not rely on the private language argument or analytic functionalism/behaviorism about qualia; it aims to show the Conceivability Arguments fail, not to establish physicalism.
  • The paper says it does not fully treat how exceptions to the A Priori Entailment Thesis should be handled, and it sets aside full treatment of Jackson’s semantics and some objections.
  • Evident from the text: the argument depends on contested auxiliary assumptions—that zombies have intentional states, that zombie phenomenal⁺ terms refer to physical states, and that a prioricity supervenes on conceptual role—which Balog defends but acknowledges as objectionable.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.2307/2998286

Cites

29 of 29 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

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Citations

Cites

Show all 25 references

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. –. 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.
  2. -. 1983. "New Work for a Theory of Universals." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61:343–77.

Cited by

Metadata

Authors
Balog, K.
Corresponding author
Balog, Katalin
Venue
The Philosophical Review
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1999-10
Volume
108
Issue
4
Pages
497
ISSN
0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1989084433
Cited by
242
References
25
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 34 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 4
FWCI
17.21
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The Philosophical Review (publishedVersion)
  • Rutgers University Community Repository (Rutgers University) (submittedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
Keywords
conceivability argument, zombie argument, physicalism, phenomenal consciousness, David Chalmers, mind-body problem, conceivability, possibility

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