The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
THE FIT BETWEEN CEO COMPENSATION DESIGN AND FIRM RISK.
Abstract
We examined the effects of unsystematic and systematic firm risk on CEO compensation risk bearing and total pay. Both the proportion of variable pay in the CEO pay package and the magnitude of the CEO pay package are curvilinearly related to unsystematic firm risk, i.e. they are highest under conditions of moderate firm-specific risk. Our results are consistent with agency predictions that both performance contingent pay and the greater earnings potential associated with that form of pay are highest when the agent has greater control over performance outcomes. In Press- AMJ 4 Recent research on CEO pay has moved away from decades of mostly futile attempts to find blanket evidence of incentive alignment (linking a portion of executive pay to specific performance criteria) at the top executive ranks. Instead, scholars are shifting their attention towards the identification of those conditions where incentive alignment, and thus risk sharing with CEOs, is most appropriate (e.g., Bloom & Milkovich, 1998; Gray & Canella, 1997). Most of this literature has relied on agency theory to predict those situations where placing some of the
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Cites
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Cited by
Gómez-Mejía, L. R., Haynes, K. T., Núñez-Nickel, M., Jacobson, K. J. L., & Moyano-Fuentes, J. (2007) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2189/asqu.52.1.106 · Cited by 4,380
Diversification Decisions in Family‐Controlled Firms
Gomez‐Mejia, L. R., Makri, M., & Kintana, M. L. (2010) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2009.00889.x · Cited by 1,236
Self-citationEnvironmental Performance and Executive Compensation: An Integrated Agency-Institutional Perspective
Berrone, P., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2009) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2009.36461950 · Cited by 1,234
Self-citationLuo, X., & Bhattacharya, C. B. (2009) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1509/jmkg.73.6.198 · Cited by 962
Xu, H., Luo, X. (., Carroll, J. M., & Rosson, M. B. (2011) · Decision Support Systems · doi:10.1016/j.dss.2010.11.017 · Cited by 708
Metadata
- Authors
- Miller, J. S., Wiseman, R. M., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2002-08-01
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 745-756
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W2035920517
- Cited by
- 274
- References
- 38
- FWCI
- 31.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.