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Cited by 274

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

THE FIT BETWEEN CEO COMPENSATION DESIGN AND FIRM RISK.

Miller, J. S., Wiseman, R. M., Gomez-Mejia, L. R.·2002·Academy of Management Journal

Abstract

We examined the effects of unsystematic and systematic firm risk on CEO compensation risk bearing and total pay. Both the proportion of variable pay in the CEO pay package and the magnitude of the CEO pay package are curvilinearly related to unsystematic firm risk, i.e. they are highest under conditions of moderate firm-specific risk. Our results are consistent with agency predictions that both performance contingent pay and the greater earnings potential associated with that form of pay are highest when the agent has greater control over performance outcomes. In Press- AMJ 4 Recent research on CEO pay has moved away from decades of mostly futile attempts to find blanket evidence of incentive alignment (linking a portion of executive pay to specific performance criteria) at the top executive ranks. Instead, scholars are shifting their attention towards the identification of those conditions where incentive alignment, and thus risk sharing with CEOs, is most appropriate (e.g., Bloom & Milkovich, 1998; Gray & Canella, 1997). Most of this literature has relied on agency theory to predict those situations where placing some of the

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Metadata

Authors
Miller, J. S., Wiseman, R. M., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R.
Venue
Academy of Management Journal
Published
2002-08-01
Volume
45
Issue
4
Pages
745-756
ISSN
  • 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
  • 1948-0989
OpenAlex
W2035920517
Cited by
274
References
38
FWCI
31.29
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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