Chaos, Cheating and Cooperation: Potential Solutions to the Prisoner's Dilemma
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) is widely regarded as a standard model for the evolution of cooperation. This review tries to give an outline of the development in the field since Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) spawned an avalanche of papers with the announcement of Tit-for-tat as the winner of their computer tournament. The most important advancements in the game-theoretical work on different aspects of the game are described. It becomes evident that changing any of the numerous parameters of the game will inevitably change the outcome; there is virtually no end to the IPD. Using experimental data from various taxa, the applicability of the IPD in nature is analysed and potential future developments in the area are discussed.
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Citations
Cites
A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game
Nowak, M., & Sigmund, K. (1993) · Nature · doi:10.1038/364056a0 · Cited by 1,797
Punishment in animal societies
Clutton-Brock, T. H., & Parker, G. A. (1995) · Nature · doi:10.1038/373209a0 · Cited by 1,043 · cited 1×
“Corresponding punishment of different nuances of defection seems more realistic (see Clutton-Brock and Parker 1995 for the role of punishment, and Leimar and Axén 1993 for a discussion on gradually reactive behaviour).”
BackgroundTit for tat in heterogeneous populations
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1992) · Nature · doi:10.1038/355250a0 · Cited by 1,029
Punctuated equilibrium comes of age
Gould, S. J., & Eldredge, N. (1993) · Nature · doi:10.1038/366223a0 · Cited by 957
Reciprocity and the emergence of reputation
Pollock, G., & Dugatkin, L. A. (1992) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/s0022-5193(05)80765-9 · Cited by 142
Cited by
Models of cooperation based on the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift game
Doebeli, M., & Hauert, C. (2005) · Ecology Letters · doi:10.1111/j.1461-0248.2005.00773.x · Cited by 871
The exploitation of mutualisms
Bronstein, J. L. (2001) · Ecology Letters · doi:10.1046/j.1461-0248.2001.00218.x · Cited by 516
Competitive altruism: from reciprocity to the handicap principle
Roberts, G. (1998) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.1998.0312 · Cited by 514
The evolution of interspecific mutualisms
Doebeli, M., & Knowlton, N. (1998) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.95.15.8676 · Cited by 476
The Prisoner's Dilemma and polymorphism in yeast SUC genes
Greig, D., & Travisano, M. (2004) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rsbl.2003.0083 · Cited by 279
Maye, A., Hsieh, C.-H., Sugihara, G., & Brembs, B. (2007) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000443 · Cited by 271
Self-citationFrom reciprocity to unconditional altruism through signalling benefits
Lotem, A., Fishman, M. A., & Stone, L. (2003) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2002.2225 · Cited by 104
Heterogeneity Stabilizes Reciprocal Altruism Interactions
FISHMAN, M. A., LOTEM, A., & STONE, L. (2001) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1006/jtbi.2000.2248 · Cited by 36
“…the introduction, a large number of conditional cooperation strategies able to discriminate against unconditional altruists (cf. Nowak et al., 1995; Brembs, 1996), were formulated following the demonstration that TfT playing populations can be invaded by unconditional altruists and subsequently by…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Brembs, B., & Brembs, B.
- Venue
- Oikos
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1996-05
- Volume
- 76
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 14
- ISSN
- 0030-1299 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2117416263
- Cited by
- 106
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 8.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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