The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The evolution of interspecific mutualisms
Open accessAbstract
Interspecific mutualisms are widespread, but how they evolve is not clear. The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is the main theoretical tool to study cooperation, but this model ignores ecological differences between partners and assumes that amounts exchanged cannot themselves evolve. A more realistic model incorporating these features shows that strategies that succeed with fixed exchanges (e.g., Tit-for-Tat) cannot explain mutualism when exchanges vary because the amount exchanged evolves to 0. For mutualism to evolve, increased investments in a partner must yield increased returns, and spatial structure in competitive interactions is required. Under these biologically plausible assumptions, mutualism evolves with surprising ease. This suggests that, contrary to the basic premise of past theoretical analyses, overcoming a potential host’s initial defenses may be a bigger obstacle for mutualism than the subsequent recurrence and spread of noncooperative mutants.
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Cites
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Cited by
Phenotypic Plasticity in the Interactions and Evolution of Species
Agrawal, A. A. (2001) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1060701 · Cited by 1,630
Models of cooperation based on the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift game
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Self-citationThe evolution of plant–insect mutualisms
Bronstein, J. L., Alarcón, R., & Geber, M. (2006) · New Phytologist · doi:10.1111/j.1469-8137.2006.01864.x · Cited by 538
The exploitation of mutualisms
Bronstein, J. L. (2001) · Ecology Letters · doi:10.1046/j.1461-0248.2001.00218.x · Cited by 516
Evolutionary dynamics in structured populations
Nowak, M. A., Tarnita, C. E., & Antal, T. (2010) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2009.0215 · Cited by 512
Metadata
- Authors
- Doebeli, M., & Knowlton, N.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 1998-07-21
- Volume
- 95
- Issue
- 15
- Pages
- 8676-8680
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2046942447
- Cited by
- 476
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 31.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
